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Abstract
The idea that severe penalties effectively deter crime is at the core of theoretical work on crime and
punishment in economics but is not fully supported by the empirical evidence. The first chapter
identifies conditions under which a penalty loses deterrence power and may even exacerbate social
losses. The key assumption is that the criminal can only be detected and stopped by the victim
before completing the crime. It differs from the standard framework in which the apprehension is
triggered after the completion of the crime. The victim in our model plays an active and critical
role in deterring the criminal.
The second chapter shows that a social planner can motivate security investments by imposing
a fine on victims such as data controllers or processors who fail to prevent attacks. An intuitive idea
is that victims considering only their own potential losses exert insufficient security effort when
crimes may cause additional social damages; a punishment can internalize social losses for them.
However, we find that crime’s externality has no impact on the victim’s fine at the equilibrium
when the hacker is deterred. Although the hacker can always be deterred if the victim’s fine is
sufficiently large, the social planner chooses not to deter the hacker when the crime’s externality is
small and the expected punishment for the hacker is constrained.
The third chapter considers the design of a contest in which the prize may motivate not only
productive effort but also some damaging actions. The organizer must choose prizes, a limit on
damaging actions, and an audit probability. We explore optimal contest design in this setting. A
key finding is that when the value of contestants’ output is low it may be optimal to motivate much
less effort than first best, because the prize spread necessary to induce higher effort necessitates a
high level of enforcement, which is not worth the cost. When the value of output is sufficiently
high it becomes optimal to offer a high prize spread to motivate effort that is substantial but still
below first-best, with costly enforcement then being employed to constrain damaging actions.
v
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Chapter 1
Cybercrime and Punishment: A Rational
Victim Model
1.1

Introduction

Gary Becker’s (1968) seminal work introduced to the economics literature the notion of a rational
criminal, one who chooses whether to commit a crime based on a comparison of the expected
benefits from committing it to the expected costs from possible detection and punishment. The
idea proved enormously useful, and has become the standard framework for both theoretical and
empirical work on crime and punishment in economics. In a standard model the social planner
sets both the probability and the severity of punishment to maximize social welfare, and social
welfare depends on the benefits of the crime to the offender, the damage from the crime to the
victims or society at large, and the costs of catching and punishing the offender. Implicit in this
formulation, though, are assumptions that if the offender chooses to commit a crime he or she
does so successfully with no possibility of being stopped, the victim has no way to protect him- or
herself against crime, and the government is the only entity with the means to deter crime.
There are many types of crime for which these assumptions do not hold, and shoplifting
provides a straightforward example. Many, if not most, merchants employ countermeasures like
security tag sensors at store exits to catch shoplifting as it occurs, because once the item leaves
the store there is little chance of apprehending the thief. Shoplifters know this and so take their
own measures to increase their chances of getting away with the theft. Not only is the success
1

probability of crime uncertain, it is also endogenous with both the offender and the intended victim
able to influence it. Government agencies, such as the police, are unlikely to catch the offender
without the merchant’s help, and in many instances the police only become aware of the offender
if the merchant hands the offender over to them. In short, shoplifting provides an example where
the intended victim can undertake countermeasures to prevent the crime, the offender can take
measures to improve his own probability of success, and the offender is unlikely to be caught and
punished if the crime is successful.
Shoplifting is a very old problem, but a newer one makes this analysis much more germane.
The problem is cybercrime and it is characterized by these same features. A hacker with greater
skills or more advanced technology has a better chance of breaching the target’s security measures,
but the intended victim’s countermeasures make it less likely the hacker will succeed. A successful
hack means that the offender accesses the data without being caught, but when the security
measures stop the hacker they can also lead to his identification and punishment. Far from being
a passive participant in the crime, here the intended victim plays a major role in determining
both the crime’s success and the offender’s chances of being caught and punished. To model
cybercrime, one must adapt Becker’s classic model to include the intended victim as a rational,
active participant.
Furthermore, cybercrime can be viewed as an evolution to traditional crimes. Although cyber
crimes are comparable to some traditional crimes such as shoplifting, questions such as should
we punish cyber criminals the same way as we do traditional criminals? Should we impose more
severe sentences on cyber criminals because modern technologies are easy to access and offenderfriendly? arises. Without enough cybercrime convictions, judges have little to follow besides
sentencing guidelines such as Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in which stiffer sentences are tied
to greater social losses and deterrence power. Thus, judges often impose draconian punishment
to send strong messages to potential cybercriminals. We aim to examine the common believes on
cybercrime punishment by using the rational victim model adapted from Becker’s economic crime
model.
In this paper we construct and analyze a model with a rational hacker, a rational victim, and
a social planner. The social planner moves first, setting the penalty a criminal faces when caught.
The intended victim moves second, choosing the level of costly-self protection, and higher levels
2

of self-protection make it more likely that the crime is stopped before completion. When the
crime is stopped, there is some probability that the criminal is identified, but when the crime is
carried through to completion, the criminal becomes impossible to punish. The hacker moves last,
choosing whether to attempt the crime and, if so, the level of effort to exert toward successfully
completing it1 .
The results of the analysis differ greatly from the standard model. First, conditional on not
being deterred, increases in the government-imposed penalty lead the offender to exert more effort.
In other words, when the penalty for being caught rises, what criminal events that do occur tend
to be executed more carefully. The intuition behind this result comes from thinking about the
problem as a contest between the offender on the one hand and the intended victim on the other. In
a contest incentives are driven by the spread between the payoff upon success and the payoff upon
failure, and the expected penalty increases this spread. Using our running examples, as penalties
increase, data breach attempts use more sophisticated programming and violent property crimes
involve more heavily-armed offenders. Because of this, increased fines can lead to reduced social
welfare especially when the victim’s loss is large.
Second, the penalty on apprehended criminals does not directly change the optimization
problem of the victim, but it changes victim’s behavior as she best-responds to hacker. An
increased penalty that motivates greater hacker effort may induce the victim to put less effort
into self protection if the victim is likely to lose the contest. Intuitively speaking, a contestant may
reserve the effort if the other contestant is highly incentivized and extremely hard-working.
Third, there are circumstances under which the offender cannot be deterred, regardless of the
size of the fine. This results when the size of the benefit to the offender relative to the size of the
loss to the victim, together with the technology available to the offender, create a situation in which
higher fines yield by the parties that ensures the offender wins. The model therefore offers a new
explanation for the empirical findings of smaller deterrence effects of the expected punishment on
property crimes than violent crimes (20; 23; 8; 21; 6). The model presented here fits property
crimes well since victims can help with deterrence and offenders tend to be caught in the act or not

1 According

to the influential work, [30], in computer security, hackers first scan the network in search for
known vulnerabilities and detect what program or service is listening on that port. Once hackers gathered sufficient
information regarding the network’s weakness, they will send worms to exploit those vulnerabilities.
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caught at all. They do not fit violent crimes well where victims have less ability to prevent success
and detection often occurs after the act.
When deterrence is impossible, a counterintuitive result obtains: the penalty should be as large
as possible when the loss to the victim is relatively small, but the penalty should be zero when the
loss to the victim is above some threshold. The reason is that when the loss to the victim is small
the large penalty keeps the victim from investing too much in self-protection, but when the loss is
larger the zero penalty keeps the offender from trying so hard to succeed.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.3 explains the game between the offender and the
victim. It identifies the condition under which the hacker is not deterred regardless of the size of the
fine. Section 1.4 investigates the optimal punishment to a domestic hacker from a social planner’s
view and how technology influences the punishment. Section 1.5 identifies the optimal punishment
to a foreign hacker. Section 1.6 discusses cybercrime policies and 1.7 provides possible extensions
of this paper. Section 1.8 concludes the paper.

1.2

Literature Review

This paper builds on the burgeoning literature at the intersection of information science and
economics on crime. Three assumptions differentiate this paper from the existing literature: first,
we model the interaction between the hacker and the victim as a contest; second, we assume the
hacker cannot be apprehended if he successfully breaches into the victim’s computer; third, we
divide the law and enforcement role into security and punishment; the victim secure her online
properties and provide evidence to law and enforcement to apprehend the hacker.
The first two assumptions create a new role for the cybercrime penalty—the hacker’s prize if
he loses the contest (prize for an unsuccessful breach). The second assumption can be interpreted
as detection is not triggered by the criminal benefit but by the criminal behavior2 . A hacker cannot
be stopped and apprehended if none of his criminal behavior is detected. Thus, a successful
breach implies the hacker’s criminal behavior is not detected by the security system, and thus
will not be convicted and punished. By connecting the probability of breach with the probability
2 In

data breach, most victim do not know they have been breached since no data is missing and no cyber activity
is detected

4

of detection, our gaming structure and results differ substantially from the existing literature. The
third assumption allows us to identify a coordination failure between the two defenders—the victim
and the government.
The related studies have formulated offenders’ probability of success as a function of factors
controlled by both the offender and the defender. Theoretical work in the literature of criminal
behavior find that the public punishment reduces the security investment of the victim so that the
resulting optimum could have a higher level of crime (28, 1, 29). Studies in information security
assume firms are self-reliant in cybercrime (e.g. 13; 17; 35). [35] constructs a probability of breach
which can be influenced by the information system’s vulnerability, the attack probability, and
the information-security investment. Studies in network literature examine the optimal resources’
allocation for a central planner to defend attackers in a network (e.g.15;14). In [14], the probability
of a successful attack is modeled by a Tullock contest. However, these studies implicitly assume
that the criminal can only be apprehended after the completion of the crime.3 Thus, the penalty
imposed on the hacker plays a different role in our model.
Furthermore, most of these studies focus on the defenders optimal resource allocation, for
example, the defender’s optimal security investment and how the investment changes the criminal
behavior. Our focus is on the optimal punishment to cyber criminals. The punishment’s deterrence
effect in their model is consistent with [3], in which sufficiently severe punishments can effectively
deter crimes. In contrast, we find that severe punishment has no deterrence power under some
circumstances.

1.3

The game between the offender and the victim

We model the problem as a three-player sequential game between the social planner, the intended
victim, and the potential hacker. The social planner moves first, setting the fine F the hacker must
pay if caught.4 The intended victim moves second, observing F and then choosing the amount of
costly security effort s to exert. This effort both reduces the probability that the crime is successful
and increases the probability that the hacker is caught in the act. The potential hacker moves last,
3 The
4F

assumption is originated from [3].
is an expected fine which contains the probability of conviction and an actual fine.
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observing both F and s before deciding whether to commit a crime and, if so, how much costly
effort x to exert to improve the chances of success. This section focuses on the subgame between
the victim and the hacker, taking the fine as exogenous.
The probability that the crime is successful is determined by the relative effort of the hacker
and the victim and governed by the function p : R2+ → [0, 1] given by

p(x, s) =





x
x+s ,
1
2,

if (x, s) 6= (0, 0)

(1.1)

if (x, s) = (0, 0)

This is the standard contest success function introduced by [33]. The probability of winning is a
function of the hacker’s and the victim’s effort. Increases in the hacker’s effort make success more
likely while increases in the victim’s security effort s make it less likely. Also, the success function
is concave in x and convex in s, with pxx < 0 and pss > 0.5
The hacker is risk neutral and chooses both whether to commit a crime and how much effort to
provide if he does. His expected payoff from attempting a crime is given by
H(x) ≡ p(x, s)B −

1
x − (1 − p(x, s))F,
β

(1.2)

where B is the benefit he receives if the crime is successful, the cost of effort is x/β , and F is
the expected fine he pays if he is unsuccessful. An expected fine captures the idea that when the
victim stops the crime, doing so may or may not lead to a case the authorities want to prosecute.
The expected fine combines both the probability of successful prosecution and the nominal fine if
convicted. The parameter β captures the impact of the hacker’s technology. With better technology
the hacker can achieve the same success probability at lower cost.6

8

5 Results of our model rely on the properties of the Tullock contest rather than the specific contest success
functional form, and we use one that gives the contestants equal weight for simplicity. [27] provides axiomatic
foundations for the Tullock contest function.
6 The parameter β also serves to increase the generality of the model in a manner reminischent of a generalized
contest success function. It is shown below in equation (1.7) that as β moves from + (costless effort) to 2(B + F)/L
(costly effort) the hacker’s equilibrium probability of success falls from 1 to 0.
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The hacker maximizes H(x) subject to the constraint x ≥ 0, reflecting the fact that effort cannot
be negative.7 Conditional on choosing to commit a crime, the hacker’s best-response function is
 p
 s(B + F)β − s for F >
x∗ (s, F) =

0
for F ≤

s
β
s
β

−B

(1.3)

−B

When s is sufficiently small, the hacker’s maximization problem has an interior solution, but when
s is large the hacker goes to the corner solution of x∗ = 0. Without discussing whether the hacker
is deterred by the victim’s effort and the fine, for now, we simply assume this corner solution is
still conditional on the hacker attempting the crime; he just attempts it without exerting any effort
toward being successful8 .
The expression yields some counterintuitive behavior. The hacker exerts positive effort when
the fine is large (F >

s
β

− B) but zero effort when the fine is small (F ≤

s
β

− B). Additionally, the

hacker’s benefit B and the expected fine F appear only together. These two outcomes are related.
Committing the crime successfully leads to gaining B, but it also means avoiding detection and
escaping the penalty F. Because of this, the total value of success is B + F, and this result comes
entirely from the fact that to be prosecuted the hacker must be caught in the act. Overall, the fine
affects the hacker’s decision in two ways: (i) the fine increases the expected cost and therefore
reduces the hacker’s payoff from engaging the crime; and (ii) the fine reduces the probability of
detection because it motivates the hacker to work harder to avoid being punished.
From expression (1.3) it also becomes clear that increases in the expected fine make the hacker
exert more effort, irrespective of the security level chosen by the victim. Turning attention to the
victim’s security efforts, the hacker may or may not exert more effort when the victim’s security
level rises, as shown in Figure 1.1. Since dx∗ /ds = (x∗ − s)/2s, hacker effort increases when the
victim employs stronger security measures if and only if s ≤ (B + F)β /4. Noting that x∗ ((B +
F)β /4, F) = (B + F)β /4, when viewed in Figure 1.1 with hacker effort x on the vertical axis
and victim effort s on the horizontal one, the hacker’s best-response function is hump-shaped and
reaches a maximum where it crosses the 45-degree line.
7 H 00 (x) = p (x∗ , s)(B + F) < 0, with the inequality holding because the Tullock success function has p < 0.
xx
xx
This guarantees that an interior solution is a maximum.
8 We show below in Proposition 1.1 that the victim always exerts strictly positive effort, which implies that the
hacker is deterred when his optimal effort is 0.
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Figure 1.1: The relationship between the hacker’s optimal effort and the victim’s security
investment
The hacker’s reservation payoff is zero, and thus he chooses to attempt the crime if and only if
H(x∗ (s, F)) > 0.
The victim suffers a loss L when the hacker succeeds, but she can reduce the probability of a
loss by investing more in security. The victim’s expected loss is given by
V (x, s) ≡ p(x, s)L + s.

(1.4)

The victim must pay the cost of increasing s, but doing so reduces the probability of suffering
the loss, L. The marginal cost of the victim’s security effort is normalized to 1. We assume the
hacker can improve the probability of success with a lower cost than the victim can, thus, β ≥ 1.
The timing of the game prescribes that the victim moves before the hacker, and in a subgame
perfect equilibrium the hacker best-responds to the victim’s choice and the expected fine set by the
authorities. Consequently, the victim chooses s to minimize V (x∗ (s, F), s), and let s∗ (F) denote

8

the solution to this problem.9 One can compute

∗

s (F) =




L2
4(B+F)β

for F >

 (B + F)β for F ≤

L
2β
L
2β

−B

(1.5)

−B

As before, this expression assumes implicitly that the hacker attempts a crime, although the hacker
might not exert any effort to make it successful.10 The top line of expression (1.5) reflects values
of the parameters for which s∗ remains low enough for the hacker to exert positive effort, and the
bottom line reflects parameter values for which the hacker goes to the corner solution x∗ = 0. The
first result follows immediately from expression (1.5).
Proposition 1.1. The victim always invests a strictly positive amount in security (that is, s∗ (F) > 0
for all F).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that the victim chooses s = 0. The hacker observes this before
making any decisions, and by choosing any x > 0 commits a successful crime with probability
p = 1. Thus, by setting s = 0 the victim’s payoff is V (·, 0) = −L. On the other hand, if the
victim makes the security investment according to s∗ (F) in expression (1.5), the hacker’s success
probability is always smaller than 1. Furthermore, s∗ (F) ≤ L/2 for all F, and attains that value
when B + F = L/2β . Consequently, by setting the security level according to (1.5) the victim’s
expected payoff is always greater than −L/2, and the victim prefers positive effort to zero effort
no matter what fine is set.
A rational victim always engages in some self-protection. When the fine is zero the victim invests
Bβ in security, and as F increases that investment rises linearly. It peaks at s∗ (L/2β − B) = L/2,
and then decreases tangentially to zero beyond that. Importantly, the most the victim ever pays for
security is half of the potential loss from a successful crime. Because the security investment is
strictly positive the hacker’s probability of success is zero when he exerts zero effort. Since zero
9 The

second-order condition is
d 2V (x∗ (s), s)
L
=
1 > 0.
1 3
ds2
4β 2 s 2 (B + F) 2

10 The

conditions for the two parts of expression (1.5) match the conditions for the two parts of (1.3) but rearranged
so that they relate to the fine, not the level of security chosen by the victim.
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effort brings −F payoff to the hacker, he will not attempt the crime. Therefore, the bottom line of
expression (1.3) indicates the hacker is deterred by the victim’s effort.
Figure 1.2 uses equation (1.5) to depict how the victim responds to changes in the fine.
Security investments and fines are strategic complements when fines are small, otherwise, they
are strategic substitutes with increases in the government-set penalty partially crowding out the
victim’s investment in self-protection. The intuition behind stems from the nature of the contest.
Imaging in a race, a runner can be discouraged if the competitor runs much faster. When winning
is unlikely, the runner runs at his own speed so he can reserve energy. The competitor won’t spend
too much energy neither because the runner is slow. In contrast, the most energy spent when they
run at a similar speed because a bit more effort can improve the winning probability tremendously.
In Figure 1.2, the hacker is a weak competitor when F is low. As F rises, the hacker becomes
more competitive—he must exerts more effort to avoid being punished. Meanwhile, the victim is
willing to exert more security effort until the hacker works so hard that increasing security effort
have little impact on the probability of detection. The victim is discouraged when the hacker
receives too much incentive, for example, when F is larger than

L
2β

− B.

Figure 1.2: The relationship between the victim’s optimal effort and the fine
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The victim’s effort, combined with potential fines from successful prosecution, may or may not
deter the hacker from attempting the crime in the first place. To see when the hacker is deterred,
that is, when H(x∗ (s∗ (F), F)) ≤ 0, begin by substituting (1.5) into (1.3):

∗

∗

x (s (F), F) =




L
L
4(B+F) (2(B + F) − β )

for F >



0

for F ≤

L
2β
L
2β

−B

(1.6)

−B

In equilibrium the hacker exerts effort only when the benefit and fine combine to be sufficiently
large, consistent with the finding that the benefit and fine together represent the payoff difference
between a successful and an unsuccessful crime. Expression (1.6) provides additional insight into
Figure 1.2. When the fine is small (F ≤

L
2β

− B) the hacker exerts no effort, but increases in the

fine increase the spread between the prize and the penalty and so the victim must exert more effort
to keep the hacker deterred. However, when the fine gets large enough the hacker begins exerting
positive effort, and in this range the victim’s security effort and the fine become substitutes.
Substituting both s∗ (F) and x∗ (s∗ (F), F) into the success function p(x, s) yields the hacker’s
equilibrium probability of success:

L
 1−
2(B+F)β
p(x∗ (s∗ (F), F), s∗ (F)) =

0

for F >
for F ≤

L
2β
L
2β

−B

(1.7)

−B

The next proposition follows immediately from expression (1.7).
Proposition 1.2. In equilibrium, and conditional on him attempting a crime, the hacker’s success
probability increases with both the fine and the benefit from the crime, and it decreases with the
severity of the victim’s loss.
Larger fines lead to larger success probabilities for two reasons. First, as shown in Figure 1.2,
large fines tend to crowd out the victim’s security investment. Second, as shown in expression
(1.3), conditional on attempting a crime, when the fine increases so does the hacker’s equilibrium
effort. With the hacker trying harder and the victim doing less to stop him, the hacker’s success
probability rises. In addition to those listed in the proposition, expression (1.7) highlights two
additional results. When the loss to the victim is large enough that the hacker exerts no effort, the
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hacker’s success probability is zero. Third, the hacker’s technology increases the probability of
crime completion and makes deterrence unlikely.
Substituting this into H(x) from (1.2) yields

∗

∗

H(x (s (F))) =




(2B−L/β )2 +4F(B−L/β )
4(B+F)

for F >



−F

for F ≤

L
2β
L
2β

−B

(1.8)

−B

This allows us to identify the equilibrium participation condition, but the following lemma proves
useful both here and in the next section.
Lemma 1.3. If a fine of F deters the hacker in equilibrium, then any fine F 0 > F also deters the
hacker.
Proof. If the hacker attempts a crime he chooses x > 0, because if not his probability of success
is p = 0 and his expected payoff is H = −F < 0. This means that the condition F > L/2β − B
must hold so that the top line of expression (1.8) describes utility. Differentiating the top line of
expression (1.8) with respect to F yields
L2
∂H
=− 2
< 0,
∂F
4β (B + F)2
and so H(x∗ (s∗ (F))) is decreasing in F. Thus, if H(x∗ (s∗ (F))) ≤ 0 then H(x∗ (s∗ (F 0 ))) ≤ 0 for all
F 0 > F.
Proposition 1.4. In equilibrium, if B ≥ L/β the hacker attempts a crime for any value of F. If
L/2β ≤ B < L/β the hacker attempts a crime if

F < F0 ≡

L
β

− 2B



L
β

4

2


−B

(1.9)

and does not attempt a crime otherwise. If B < L/2β the hacker does not attempt a crime.
Proof. If B ≥ L/β then from (1.8) it follows directly that H(x∗ (s∗ (F))) > 0 for all F ≥ 0. Further,
L/2β − B < 0 holds, so any nonnegative fine is larger than L/2β − B, as required.
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If L/2β ≤ B < L/β , then again any nonnegative fine is larger than L/2β − B. Also,
H(x∗ (s∗ (0))) =

(2B − L/β )2
> 0.
4B

Solving H(x∗ (s∗ (F0 ))) = 0 for F0 yields

F0 =
4

L
β

− 2B



L
β

2

−B



and F0 > 0 since B < L/β . Since H is decreasing in F, it follows that H(x∗ (s∗ (F))) ≥ 0 for all
F ∈ [0, F0 ].
Finally, let B < L/2β and suppose, to the contrary, that the hacker attempts a crime. He must
exert positive effort, otherwise his payoff is −F < 0, and so it must be the case that F > L/2β − B.
As before, H decreases in F and H = 0 when the fine is set to F0 . Thus, for the hacker to have
H > 0 so he attempts a crime and x > 0 so that he exerts effort for it to succeed, the fine must
satisfy


L
β

− 2B

2

L
.
−B < F < 
L
2β
4 β −B
However, dividing both the left and right sides of the above expression by the left side yields
L
β

− 2B
.
1< 
2 βL − B
But since L/β − B > 0, this becomes
2

L
L
− 2B < − 2B,
β
β

which implies that L/β < 0, a contradiction. Consequently, the hacker does not attempt a crime
when B < L/2β .
Propositon 1.4 shows clearly the differences between the standard, rational hacker model and
the rational victim model of this paper. In the standard model the hacker commits a crime if
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the expected benefit outweighs the expected cost. Increasing the expected punishment raises
the expected cost of committing a crime, and if the fine becomes sufficiently large the hacker
is deterred. Put more starkly, in the standard model the hacker can always be deterred by a largeenough fine.
In the rational victim model, though, this is no longer true. When the hacker’s benefit from
crime B is sufficiently large (greater than L/β ), it is impossible to deter him. When the benefit
is sufficiently small (less than L/2β ) no fine is needed to deter the hacker, because sufficient
deterrence is provided by the hacker’s effort cost coupled with the victim’s impact on the chances
the crime succeeds. Only when B lies in an intermediate range does the expected punishment play
a role in deterrence, and here it has the usual result that a sufficiently large fine deters crime.
The equilibrium outcomes of the subgame are characterized by the victim’s participation
decision in Proposition 1.4, his effort choice described by expression (1.6), and the victim’s effort
choice described by expression (1.5). With these it is possible to see how changing some of the
parameters impacts the outcome of the subgame.
Suppose that the hacker’s technology improves. This could occur, for example, if a hacker
acquires better and faster hardware. The improved technology increases β , and it has the following
effects. First, not surprisingly, it expands the range of L for which the hacker attempts a crime.
It also expands the range over which the hacker cannot be deterred. Second, conditional on
attempting a crime, the hacker exerts more effort as seen in expression (1.6). Third, from
expression (1.5), the victim invests less in security conditional on the hacker participating. Finally,
the improved technology makes it more likely that the attempted crime succeeds in equilibrium, as
shown in expression (1.7).
Similar results can be found from a change in the size of the victim’s potential loss L or the size
of the hacker’s potential benefit B. As the crime becomes more costly for the victim, the victim
invests more in security, the hacker is less likely to attempt a crime, and an attempted crime is more
likely to fail. As the crime becomes more beneficial to the hacker, though, the set of circumstances
under which he attempts a crime expands, he exerts more effort when he attempts one, the victim
invests less in security when the size of the potential loss is sufficiently low, and the crime is more
likely to succeed.
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Proposition 1.4 can also be used to explore the effect of a change in the expected fine F, but
that variable is set by the authority and therefore endogenous in the game as a whole. How to
punish crimes when the hacker must be caught in the act and must be caught by the victim is the
subject of the next section.

1.4

Deterrence and Punishment

At the beginning of the game, before the victim sets the security level and the hacker decides
whether to attempt a crime and how much effort to devote to it, the social planner sets the level of
the expected fine. Before discussing the optimal penalty structure, though, it is useful to compare
the setting briefly with the standard rational criminal model.
In that model the social planner moves first, setting the probability and severity of punishment.
In our setting those two parameters are collapsed into a single entity, the expected fine F. The
hacker observes F and chooses whether to commit a crime. Doing so results in a benefit to him
of B and a loss to society of L. The victim’s role in the problem is passive, and the hacker’s
effort decision is binary, making it simply a participation decision.11 He chooses to commit the
offense if B − c − F > 0, where c is the effort cost associated with commiting the crime and 0 is
his reservation payoff. It is straightforward from this setup that a sufficiently large expected fine
deters crime, so that when F ≥ B − c the hacker chooses not to commit the crime.
The rational victim model we explore here does not share the result that a sufficiently large fine
deters crime. In fact, large fines can encourage, not discourage crime when the hacker cannot be
deterred, and the simplest way to see this is by exploring the limit as F → ∞. Suppose that B > L/β
so the hacker always attempts a crime. From expression (1.5), limF→∞ s∗ (F) = 0. From expression
(1.7) the hacker’s equilibrium probability of success has limF→∞ p = 1. Consequently, as the fine
increases without bound, the victim’s security investment approaches zero and the hacker’s chance
to succeed approaches one. Proposition 1 states that there is no equilibrium in which the victim
invests nothing in security, and therefore we exclude the case that the victim’s security approaches
to 0 as the expected fine goes to infinity. To guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, assume
11 It

is possible to obtain the standard model from the framework in the preceding section by constraining the
victim’s effort to s = 0 and setting a minimum effort level x0 > 0 that the hacker must meet or exceed if he exerts
positive effort. Then the hacker’s objective function is simply H(x) = B − x0 /β − F, where F is the expected fine.
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that there is a maximal fine F̄ and the social planner minimizes W (F) subject to the constraint that
0 ≤ F ≤ F̄.
There are two factors that drive these results. One is that the hacker avoids punishment by
committing the crime successfully and only pays the fine if the crime is unsuccessful. This makes
the criminal’s total benefit from a successful crime B + F, the direct benefit B and the avoided
penalty F. As the fine grows, so does the incentive for the hacker to succeed. The second factor
comes from the fact that penalties crowd out the victim’s own efforts at self-protection. As the
expected penalty grows, the victim’s effort approaches to zero, and that increases the hacker’s
success probability close to one. Since crimes are always successful, the hacker always commits
them, and the large penalty has no deterrent effect.
For the remainder of the paper we assume that L > B so that the loss to the victim outweighs the
benefit to the hacker. In other words, the hack is one that would be deterred in a first-best world.
In general, the social planner chooses F to minimize social loss, given by

 W C (F) ≡ p(x, s)(αL − B) + 1 x + s when crime attempted,
β
W (F) =
 W D (F) ≡ s
when no crime attempted.

(1.10)

The first line identifies the social loss function W C (F) that pertains when the hacker attempts
the crime, and the second line identifies the social loss function W D (F) which pertains when the
hacker is deterred. Whether a crime is attempted is endogenous and determined by the hacker, who
moves last in the game. The expression αL captures both the direct loss to the victim, L, combined
with any externalities stemming from the crime, and α ≥ 1. The first term in expression (1.10)
is the probability that the crime succeeds times the net loss it generates, and it recognizes that the
benefit to the hacker offsets losses to the victim. The last two terms are effort costs, with x/β the
effort cost borne by the hacker and s the security investment made by the victim. The penalty is a
transfer from the hacker to others in society (but not just to the victim) so it has no impact on social
welfare, and expression (1.10) implicitly assumes that fines can be administered costlessly. When
the hacker elects not to attempt a crime, there are no losses from the crime and no effort costs by
the hacker, but the victim must still pay for the security investment.
In a subgame perfect equilibrium the social planner correctly predicts how the victim and
hacker respond to the expected fine and each other, and so (1.10) should incorporate their behavior
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from the ensuing subgame. The social planner must decide whether or not to deter the crime, and
also what penalty to impose on hackers who are caught.
Proposition 1.5. Assume that F̄ ≥ F0 . Given α, β ≥ 1, the following describe the subgame perfect
penalty/deterrence structure:
(a) When L/B ≤

1
1
α+ 2β
− 12

the hacker attempts the crime regardless of the size of the fine. The

optimal fine is F̄.
(b) When

1
1
α+ 2β
− 12

< L/B ≤ β the hacker attempts the crime regardless of the size of the fine.

The optimal fine is 0.
(c) When β < L/B ≤ 2β , the hacker is deterred if the imposed fine is more severe than F0 . The
optimal fine is F̄, which deters crime.
(d) When L/B > 2β , the hacker is deterred at any fine. Within this range, if L ≤ 2β

p
B (B + F̄)

the optimal fine is F̄, otherwise, the optimal fine is 0.
Proof. Begin by noting that
β−

1
α+

1
2β

−

1
2

= β

2αβ − β − 1
2αβ − β + 1

= β

(αβ − β ) + (αβ − 1)
(αβ − β ) + (αβ + 1)

> 0
Thus, 0 <

B
1
α+ 2β
− 21

< β B.

When the social planner elects not to deter the crime, or when deterrence is impossible, the fine
is set to minimize the first term in expression (1.10):
1
W C (F) = p (x, s) (αL − B) + x + s
β




L
1
L
L
L2
=
1−
(αL − B) +
2 (B + F) −
+
2 (B + F) β
β 4 (B + F)
β
4 (B + F) β
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after substituting from expressions (1.5), (1.6), and (1.7). Differentiating with respect to F and
simplifying yields
 


1
L
1
∂W C (F)
L α+
=
−
−B
∂F
2β 2
2β (B + F)2

(1.11)

The denominator is positive, so the sign of the derivative is determined by the term in parentheses
on the right. Also, F appears nowhere in that term, and so the social loss function either
increases everywhere or decreases everywhere, implying that the fine is either maximal or minimal.
Conditional on not deterring the crime, the optimal fine is maximal if W C has negative slope and
minimal if it has positive slope.
Case (a): Suppose L ≤ α+ 11 − 1 B. Since L < β B, by Proposition 1.4 the hacker always attempts
2β

2

the crime regardless of the fine. From expression (1.11),

∂W C (F)
∂F

≤ 0 when L ≤

B
.
1
α+ 2β
− 12

The

optimal fine, which minimizes W C (F), is F̄ .
Case (b): Suppose

1
B
1
α+ 2β
− 21

< L ≤ β B. Since L ≤ β B, by Proposition 1.4 the hacker always

attempts the crime regardless of the fine. From expression (1.11),

∂W C (F)
∂F

> 0 when L >

B
.
1
α+ 2β
− 21

Thus the optimal fine is 0.
Case (c): Suppose β B < L ≤ 2β B. By Proposition 1.4, the hacker is deterred if F ≥ F0 and
commits the crime if F < F0 , where
2
− 2B
.
F0 = 
L
4 β −B


L
β

By expression (1.4) and Figure 1.2, s∗ (F) is downward-sloping when F >
2β B it follows that

L
2β

−B <

2β B
2β

L
2β

− B, but when L <

− B = 0, and so W D (F) is downward sloping for all values of F.

Consequently W D (F) is minimized when F is maximal at F̄.
If, instead, the hacker is not deterred, social loss is given by W C (F). As in case (a),

∂W C (F)
∂F

≥0

if and only if
L≥
and, as shown above,

B
1
α+ 2β
− 12

B
1
α + 2β
− 12

< β B < L. Thus W C (F) is upward-sloping and minimized when F

is set to 0.
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Deterring the crime minimizes social loss if and only if W D (F̄) ≤ W C (0). To compare these
two, first note that when L ≤ 2β B, by expression (1.6) the hacker chooses the same value of x∗
regardless of whether the central planner desires to deter the crime. Similarly, expression (1.5)
shows that the choice of s∗ is also independent of whether the central planner desires to deter the
crime. Because L > β B, for any F
x∗
+ s∗
β
x∗
> p(x∗ , s∗ )(αβ B − B) + + s∗
β
∗
D
> s = W (F).

W C (F) = p(x∗ , s∗ )(αL − B) +

Therefore W D (F̄) < W D (0) < W C (0) and the optimal fine is maximal.
Case (d): Assume L > 2β B. By Proposition 1.4 the hacker is deterred by any fine F ≥ 0. If
B
L

<

1
2β

then by Proposition 1.4 the hacker does not attempt a crime. By expression (1.10) social

cost is given by W D (F) = s∗ (F). The function s∗ (F) is quasiconcave and therefore attains its
minimum at one of the two endpoints of the interval [0, F̄]. From (1.5), s∗ (0) = β B since, by
assumption, 0 <

L
2β

− B. Also, s∗ (F̄) =

L2
.
4(B+F̄)β

Note that W D (0) ≤ W D (F̄) if and only if

L2
≥ Bβ
4 (B + F̄) β
L2 ≥ 4β 2 B (B + F̄)
q
L ≥ 2β B (B + F̄)
which completes the proof.

One result from Proposition 1.5 is that the optimal fine is either zero or maximal at F̄, and
which of these is optimal depends on the ratio of the loss to the victim over the benefit to the
hacker. The same ratio determines whether the hacker is deterred or not. Proposition 1.2 provides
some insight into both of these.
According to that proposition, larger fines lead to greater equilibrium success probabilities for
the hacker, both by increasing the spread between the payoffs from success and failure for the
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hacker and by crowding out security investment by the victim. When the central planner opts for a
maximal fine, then, it results in a maximal equilibrium success probability for the hacker. On the
other hand, when the central planner sets a zero fine, it maximizes the equilibrium probability that
the hack will be unsuccessful. A maximal fine can therefore be thought of as an accommodative
policy, and a minimal fine as a hindering (as opposed to deterrent) policy.
When the loss-to-benefit ration L/B is small, it means that the social loss from a successful
hack is relatively small. Case (a) in Proposition 1.5 shows that in such a circumstance the central
planner’s best choice is to accommodate the hacker with a maximal fine, thereby minimizing the
security investment made by the victim. As the loss/benefit ratio grows, it becomes worthwhile
to try to stop the hack, and the central planner switches to the hindering policy of a minimal fine
in order to induce the victim to invest in security. This is case (b). In both cases (a) and (b) the
loss/benefit ratio is small enough that the hacker attempts a crime regardless of the fine, as shown
by Proposition 1.4.
In case (c) the hacker can be deterred by a large-enough fine, and the optimal policy is for
the central planner to deter him. Once the hacker is deterred, the only source of social loss is the
victim’s security investment, and this is minimized when the central planner sets the maximal fine.
In case (d) the loss/benefit ratio is large enough that the hacker never attempts the crime,
as shown by Proposition 1.4. The central planner’s decision rests on whether security effort is
minimized with a fine of zero or a maximal fine of F̄. As suggested by Figure 1.2, for the maximal
fine to yield lower security investment F̄ must be sufficiently large, and case (d) provides this
condition.
A second result from Proposition 1.5 is that the externality from the hack, as measured by α,
plays very little role in the setting of the optimal fine. It does play a role in separating cases (a)
and (b), in both of which deterrence is impossible. As α grows, reflecting that the harm from the
hack extends further beyond the direct victim, the domain of case (a) shrinks and the domain of
case (b) grows. Somewhat counterintuitively, the proposition shows that hacks with larger negative
externalities are more likely to be punished with zero fines than with maximal ones, so the size of
the penalty does not keep pace with the size of the potential harm from the crime. The reason is
that as the externality grows, social loss is minimized by reducing the probability that the hack
succeeds, and larger fines make successful hacks more likely by crowding out security investment.
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In sum, the optimal penalty structure can be thought of as one that either accommodates the
hacker or tries to stop him. The maximal fine F̄ is the accomodative policy, while the minimal
fine of zero is the one that attempts to stop hacking in the act. The fine itself only plays a role in
deterrence in case (c), and there larger fines deter the hacker. In the other three cases, though, the
fine plays no role in deterrence.
Proposition 1.5, then, shows further differences between the standard, rational criminal model
of crime and the rational victim model presented here. In the standard model the primary role of
the penalty is deterrence, while here the primary purpose of the fine is to induce the appropriate
security investment from the victim. When both the victim’s potential loss and the externality from
the crime are relatively small, the optimal fine is the maximal one, but when the victim’s loss or
the externality are larger the fine should be zero so that the victim invests in security measures that
can stop the hack from being completed successfully.

1.5

A foreign hacker

The preceding section analyzed optimal policy under the assumption that the offender is part
of society and so his benefits and costs matter to social welfare. For some crimes, especially
cybercrimes, it is possible for the hacker to live in a foreign country, in which case his benefits and
costs would not enter social welfare. We analyze that situation in this section.
The social loss function becomes

 W C (F) ≡ p(x, s)αL + s − (1 − p(x, s))F when crime attempted,
W (F) =
 W D (F) ≡ s
when no crime attempted.

(1.12)

The equation is exactly the same when the social planner opts for deterrence, but it is different
from before when the social planner elects not to deter. The foreign hacker’s criminal benefit is not
relevant to the social loss. But the fine is a monetary transfer from a foreign country so it reduces
the social loss.
Proposition 1.6. Assume that F̄ ≥ F0 . Given α, β ≥ 1, the following describe the subgame perfect
penalty/deterrence structure:
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1
(a) When L/B ≤ min[β , α−
1 ] the hacker attempts the crime regardless of the size of the fine.
2

The optimal fine is F̄.
(b) When

1
α− 21

< L/B ≤ β , the hacker attempts the crime regardless of the size of the fine. The

optimal fine is 0. Case (b) exists if and only if β >

1
.
α− 12

(c) When β < L/B ≤ 2β , the hacker is deterred if the imposed fine is more severe than F0 . The
optimal fine is F̄, which deters crime.
(d) When L/B > 2β , the hacker is deterred at any fine. Within this range, if L ≤ 2β

p
B (B + F̄)

the optimal fine is F̄, otherwise, the optimal fine is 0.
Proof. When the social planner elects not to deter the crime, or when deterrence is impossible, the
fine is set to minimize the first term in expression (1.12):

W C (F) = p(x, s)αL + s − (1 − p(x, s))F
= (1 −

L2
L
)(αL + F) +
−F
2B + F)β
4(B + F)β

after substituting from expressions (1.5), (1.6), and (1.7). Differentiating with respect to F and
simplifying yields
∂W C (F) L2 (2α − 1) − 2LB
=
∂F
4(B + F)2 β

(1.13)

Conditional on not deterring the crime, the optimal fine is maximal if W C has negative slope
1
B) and
α− 12
1
≥ α−
1 > 0.
2

1
B).
α− 12

Given α, β ≥ 1, we must have

(L <

minimal if it has positive slope (L >

2β

By proposition (1.4), the hacker can be deterred when L > β B, otherwise, he

always attempt the crime; thus, the magnitude of

1
α− 12

relative to β affects the central planner’s

decision.
Case (a) and (b): If β ≥

1
α− 12

> 0. For L <

1
B
α− 12

≤ β B, the hacker always attempts the crime

by proposition (1.4) and the optimal fine is F̄ by expression (1.13). For

1
B
α− 12

< L ≤ β B, the

hacker attempts the crime regardless of the size of the fine and the optimal fine is 0.
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If 2β ≥

1
α− 12

> β . For L ≤ β B, the hacker always attempt the crime and by expression (1.13)

the optimal fine is F̄.
Case (c): Suppose β B < L ≤ 2β B, at any F
W C (F) = p(x∗ , s∗ )αL + s∗ − (1 − p(x∗ , s∗ ))F
2αβ L(B + F) − αL2 − LF
+ s∗
2β (B + F)
α(2β B − L) + (2αβ − 1)F
=
+ s∗
2β (B + F)

=

> s∗ = W D (F)
Thus, W D (F̄) < W C (F̄) < W C (F0 − ε) and W D (F̄) < W D (0) < W C (0). The hacker is deterred
when β B ≤ L ≤ 2β B and the optimal fine must be set at the maximum.
Case (d): same as case (d) in proposition (1.5).

Comparing the optimal fine imposed on a foreign hacker with a domestic hacker, the optimal
fines remain the same when L/B > β in which the hacker is deterred. When the hacker is not
deterred, the central planner prefers to punish the foreign hacker with the maximal fine. It is
because the fine collected from a foreign hacker reduces the social loss, while the fine from a
domestic hacker is a money transfer within the society. Thus, when the victim’s loss and the
crime’s externality is small, the social planner tend to use the maximal fine to reduce security
effort exerted by the domestic victim.
In many circumstances, apprehending a foreign hacker can be extremely expensive. It often
requires the foreign country’s cooperation which limits the central planner’s ability of setting F̄. In
addition, if the foreign government freezes the hacker’s account the fine is no longer feasible, and
other penalties (i.e. imprisonment) hardly contribute to the social benefit. The social loss function
when crime attempted can be written as
W C (F) ≡ p(x, s)αL + s + (1 − p(x, s))rF
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where r is the marginal cost of the penalty, r ≥ 0. Differentiating with respect to F and simplifying
yields
∂W C (F) (2α − 1)L2 + 2rBL
=
>0
∂F
4(B + F)2 β

(1.14)

If the hacker attempts the crime, increasing the fine exacerbates the social loss. Thus, when
L ≤ β B, the hacker is not deterred and the optimal fine is always 0. When L > β B, the optimal
fines remains the same as stated in case (c) and (d) in proposition (1.5) or (1.6). When enforcing
the fine is costly, the social planner must not punish an undeterrable hacker, because a fine not
only increases the hacker’s probability of success but also imposes a burden of enforcement on the
society.

1.6

Cybercrime Policies

Law and enforcement policies are crucial in preventing and combating cybercrime. Current
cybercrime policies are made according to cybercrime acts which are addressed in different ways.
Some acts are not considered a criminal offence at all in national law. Some are addressed by
administrative sanctions that are also used for a range of non-criminal offence, including copyright
offenses, sending spam, data breaching, and the production of computer misuse tools. Other acts
may be a criminal offense either under a general or a cyber-specific law.
The“International Crime Classification Framework” mandated by the United Nations Economic and Social Council envisages cybercrime acts as an attribute of traditional crimes that
involve a computer element [9]. Although many cyber crimes, for example, data breaching,
can be viewed as property crimes—hackers steal online properties, traditional laws can only be
applied to limited extent. The technological developments changes incentives to criminals as well
as the structure of the crime so that pushes the legislation to take on new concepts and objects, not
traditionally addressed by law.
Cybercrime differs from traditional property crimes in the following ways. First, the legal
concept of “theft” applied in traditional laws is not so appropriate to cybercrime, for the reason that
the online property such as computer data remains in the possession of the victim after the crime.
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Therefore, it leads to the second difference that a large share of the victims in cybercrime do not
know they were the victim because no evidence shows their online properties were expropriated.
Third, victims’ online territory is secured by the owner of the territory rather than the police. For
example, thieves may encounter a police on the street (a public area) while cybercriminals do not.
So police fail to guard the online properties for private sectors. Thus, if a victim fails to detect the
hacker, little evidence will be provided to the police for apprehension.
The technological development changes the best timing for criminal detection and transfers
the responsibility of security from the law and enforcement to the victim, however, victims do not
share the goal of maximizing the social welfare so that a coordination failure emerges from the
defender side—the victim does not set the security effort to the social optimum.

1.7

Discussion

Having established my main points, I now discuss some extensions and variations of my model.

1.7.1

Costly punishment

This paper assumes the fine has no cost to the society. In reality, it is costly to implement many
penalties such as incarceration. I reexamine the optimal punishment that minimizes the social loss,
for the reason that the cost on the penalty affects the social planner’s decision.
I find the optimal punishment remains 0 when the victim’s loss is within the range of
(Bβ , α+ B1 − 1 ]. Under this condition, the hacker is not deterred by any penalty and the social
2β

2

planner should not punish the hacker. When the victim’s loss is less than

B
,
1
α+ 2β
− 12

the optimal

punishment is no longer the maximum. The social planner should adjust the penalty according to
the hacker’s gain and criminal technology, the cyber attack’s externality, and the social cost of the
punishment. The punishment cost reduces the optimal punishment (proof see Appendix A3).

1.7.2

Uncertain Attack

The model can be generalized to the condition in which the victim and the central planner anticipate
the variety of threats. Some hackers are highly motivated to encroach on the online properties, but
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some are less motivated. For example, hackers face different search barriers for potential buyers
and obtain different offers in the dark net. Thus, the victim and central planner have to make their
decision for defense under such uncertainty. Incorporating such uncertainty is realistic. Consider
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Cybercrime. The punishment for committing one computer
crime depends on the damages caused and risk of harm created. In another word, the penalty is set
according to the victim’s loss but not to the hacker’s criminal benefit. The reason may be that the
hackers’ criminal benefits are uncertain.
I use the variety of potential threats is represented by a distribution of hackers’ benefit. A hacker
takes only one draw from the benefit pool and learns his benefit from engaging the cybercrime.
The victim and the central planner do not know the exact benefit of the hacker they encounter
but the distribution of hackers’ benefit. They must optimize their security investment and public
punishment to minimize expected losses. A hacker realizes a value of B from the distribution
and chooses his action contingent on it as well as the victim’s security investment and the public
punishment if being caught.
I simply assume the hacker’s criminal benefit distributes uniformly on [B̄ − d2 , B̄ + d2 ]. The
hacker takes a draw from the distribution and then decides whether to attempt the crime and how
much effort to put if the crime is profitable. His payoff function is the same as it is in the full
information model because the criminal benefit is known to the hacker.
The victim knows the distribution of the hacker’s criminal benefit. She protects her property
through investing in a security system. And her expected loss excluding the cost of security effort
is conditional on the hacker attempts the crime. According to equation (1.3), the hacker exerts zero
effort in the crime if B + F ≤ βs , the incentive to hackers is not sufficient. Hackers are deterred if
B≤

s
β

− F.

In addition to the condition B ≤

s
β

− F, a hacker is deterred when the participation constraint

is violated, H(x(s, F)) ≤ 0, which yields another condition for deterrence:
s

s(B + F) s
+ ≤0
β
β
r
√
s 2
( B+F −
) ≤F
β

H(x(s, F)) = B − 2
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Rewrite the constraint as a range of criminal benefit B,

B≤
The hacker with B >

s
+2
β

s

Fs
β

s
β

always attempt the crime if no punishment is imposed. If a punishment
q
is imposed, a hacker does not attempt the crime if his criminal benefit is less or equal to βs + 2 Fs
β .
Let’s first assume there is no punishment is imposed on cybercrime, F = 0. In a society where
the punishment for cyber attacks is absent, the victim invests in a security system to stop the hacker.
The victim’s expected loss is

V (x(s), s) ≡

Z B̄+ d
2
s
β

pB (x, s)LdB + s

(1.15)

The victim chooses the optimal security effort for situations where all hackers attempts the
crime ( βs < B̄ − d2 ), some hackers attempt the crime (B̄ − d2 ≤

s
β

< B̄ + d2 ), and no hacker attempts

the crime ( βs ≥ B̄ + d2 ).

s∗ =















q
2 d2
L2 B̄− B̄ − 4
2
2β
B̄2 − d4
L2
4(B̄+ d2 )β

(B̄ + d2 )β

q

2

2

L
d
for B̄ > 4β
2 + 4
q
2
L2
+ d4 ≥ B̄ >
for
4β 2

for B̄ ≤

L
2β

L
2β

− d2

(1.16)

− d2

In equation (1.16), the corresponding situations from the top line are: none of the potential
hackers are deterred by the victim’s security effort, some of them are deterred, and all of them
are deterred. When attack is random and when the victim’s optimal security effort is able to deter
some or all hackers, the victim responds to the highest value of criminal benefit rather than to the
whole distribution. In another word, the victim’s security effort does not change with the actual
criminal benefit of the hacker. The distribution of criminal benefit can affect the possibility of each
of the three situations. The variance d expands the range of the second condition and discourages
the victim’s security effort.
When the social planner punishes the hacker, F > 0. Hackers with criminal benefit B ≤ βs +
q
2 Fs
β will not attempt the crime; the victim only responds to the hackers who attempt the crime.
The victim’s expected loss is

27

V (x(s), s) ≡

Z B̄+ d
2
q

s
+2
β

Fs
β

pB (x, s)LdB + s

(1.17)

The optimal security effort increases with the mean B̄ and variance d of the criminal distribution
and decreases with the victim’s loss L and the fine F. There are still circumstances that the hacker
always attempts the crime for any fines.

1.8

Conclusion

The paper considers a situation with a rational hacker and a rational victim. The victim can invest
in security that not only increases the chance that the hacker’s attempt at crime fails, but also leads
to punishment of the hacker by an authority. However, the severe punishment provides incentives
to the wrong player at the game, the hacker. The primary result is that unless the crime is very
beneficial to the criminal, and assuming that the social planner cares about that benefit, optimal
fines are as small as possible. Another major result is that there are circumstances under which
deterrence is impossible even when fines are sufficiently large.
When constructing the optimal public punishment, for crimes discussed in this paper, the law
and enforcement must consider the loss to the victim, the criminal benefit as well as the technology
available to the criminal and the scale of the crime. Because under certain conditions, severe
punishment cannot deter criminals but exacerbates the social loss.
Nowadays, the modus operandi of criminals has changed substantially as a result of the
development of internet. Traditional crimes, such as robbery, appear in a new electronic version
(e.g., online banking fraud) and are facilitated by the Internet. According to the yearly Internet
Crime Report, the reported loss in the U.S. rose dramatically from less than 18 million dollars
in 2001 to over 1.4 billion in 2016. The indirect and defense costs for cyber crimes are much
higher than that. Although cybercrime has become a threat, legislation is relatively vague about
this type of crime compared to traditional crimes. Since it is hard to catch a hacker, judges tend to
impose severe penalties to deter cybercriminals. For example, although downloading millions of
articles from JSTOR without permission is a non-violent crime, an individual faces the possibility
of decades in jail and backbreaking penalties; in contrast, violent crimes, such as rape carry much

28

lighter sentences. The results of this paper suggest hackers with advanced knowledge or computing
power are unlikely being deterred regardless of the severity of the penalty. Compare to hacking the
information system of a company, a hacker steals information from a personal computer should be
punished more severely. Not only the former crime has a large scale, but the loss to the victim tends
to be large. The reason stems from incentives a fine provides. When the victim’s loss is small the
central planner should set a large fine so the victim will reduce the costly security investment. As
the victim’s loss rises and eventually outweighs the cost on security investment, no fine should be
imposed on the hacker. So the hacker will not work harder to avoid being punished and the victim
will not be passive in protecting herself. Regard to the deterrence power of the public punishment,
a government can develop technologies to reduce security’s cost and on changing the structure of
network connections.
In general, problems focus more on the behavior of the prospective victim than the prospective
offender are within the scope of this rational victim model. The practice of citizens owning and
carrying guns is becoming more and more prevalent in the United States as Americans realize
“the police do not owe a specific duty to provide police services to citizens based on the public
duty doctrine”. After Warren v. District of Columbia; 444 A.2d. 1, D.C. Ct. of Ap. (1981)
and Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), thirty three states have enacted some form of
stand-your-ground law. The common rationale for allowing citizens to carry gun is to help deter
crime against them and others nearby. Our model suggests when the expected punishment from
law and enforcement is low, the private security investment inevitably rises; the stand-your-ground
law shifts the right of punishment from law and enforcement to citizens’ hands , which restores the
deterrence power to the punishment.
In conclusion, we should note several issues that were not addressed here. For one, we assume
hackers only commit one crime, so incapacitation is not an issue. One may convert our model
into a dynamic search model and incorporate the cost of recidivism in the social loss. For another,
further crimes would need new analysis. Once new methods for law and enforcement to identify
cyber criminals are invented, police may become less dependent on the victims’ effort. The latest
technologies of quantum communication and block chain can help build a more secured network,
and therefore, eliminating many cyber crimes such as identity theft and data breach. As might be
expected, crimes may evolve toward some types that are strengthened by the new technology, for
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example, human trafficking, drug selling, and so on, for the reason that online transactions will be
more secure than before. After all, new crimes will grow from other platforms that disadvantages
the defender, and if the gaming structure of the new crimes changes we probably need new models
to describe them.
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Chapter 2
Can Punishing Cybercrime Victims
Effectively Deter Hackers?
Organizations controlling or processing users’ private data are responsible for data breaches,
despite also being the victims of cybercrime. For example, the Equifax hack in 2017 resulted
in more than 145 million users’ account information, including social security numbers, being
stolen. Evidence shows the major attack could have been prevented if Equifax had installed
the software patch released two months before the attack. In 2013, hackers breached Target’s
security system through the air conditioning system and obtained 40 million Target customers’
credit card information. It is not a unique instance, in 2018 July, nearly all of the largest
automakers’ confidential technical information were exposed by a shared vendor called Level
One. Hackers not only can sell a automaker’s core technology to its competitor but also can
revise any confidential documents saved online. Even worse, as we connect more physical devices
to the Internet and integrate more societies into the “Internet of things,” hackers can launch more
extensive cyberattacks due to the networks expanded scale. Thus, organizations’ security efforts
are crucial in protecting customer databases from cyberattacks.
New laws are designed to draw the line of responsibility so that citizens are protected from
privacy and data breaches in an increasingly data-driven world. The General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), which was approved by the European Parliament on May 25, 2018 , is more
intense than previous data-protection laws in many ways . For example, GDPR has raised the datacollection bar. Organizations cannot collect EU citizens’ data unless they guarantee users’ right
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to access the collected data and fully disclose how the data is used. Additionally, organizations
controlling or processing EU citizens’ data are subject to a fine for any infringements, such as
failing to notify users of data breaches within 72 hours or violating the privacy by design concept1 .
In April 2018, U.S. senators Amy Klobuchar and John Kennedy introduced the Social Media
Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2018, which features similar protocols addressed
in GDPR and targets social media companies like Facebook and Google.
The new regulations raise the data controllers’ and processors’ potential loss from data
breaches. Governments are seeking to punish organizations that do not treat data safely. Therefore,
this paper identifies the conditions under which a government must increase a victim’s expected
loss.
Our model extends the framework established in Chapter 1 by allowing the social planner to
impose a fine on both the hacker and the victim. Chapter 1 shows that punishing the hacker can
motivate the hacker’s criminal effort and discourage the victim’s security effort. Therefore, the
hacker’s fine reduces the probability of apprehension and the hacker cannot always be deterred.
This paper suggests that punishing the victim motivates the victim’s security effort, improving
the probability of apprehension. If the victim’s fine is sufficiently large, hacker’s fine can never
discourage the victim’s security effort. By adjusting the victim’s fine, the hacker’s fine regain the
deterrence power and hacker can always be deterred. Intuitively, the greater social damage a crime
creates the more severe punishment is expected to be set. However, the optimal fine for deterring
a crime is independent of the crime’s externality. The hacker’s fine is set at the maximum and the
victim’s fine increases with the hacker’s benefit and criminal technology and decreases with the
victim’s loss. The reason is that deterrence only relates to hacker’s and victim’s effort incentives,
and crime’s externality is not one of them.
In addition, there are conditions under which the social planner allow the hacker to proceed.
This results when the crime’s externality is very low and the expected punishment for hacker is
constrained. If the social planner has limited ability to punish the hacker, the victim must exert
certain security effort to deter the hacker, which is costly to the society. To reduce the victim’s

1 Privacy

by design treats data protection as part of the designing of systems, rather than an addition. Article 25
specifies:“The controller shall...implement appropriate technical and organizational measures...in an effective way...
in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects.”
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security effort, the social planner chooses to tolerate such crimes. Instead of punishing them, the
social planner does not punish the hacker and compensate the victim.

2.1

The game between the hacker and the victim

In the new setting, the social planner can set fines on both the hacker and the victim. The hacker
pays the fine if he fails to breach the security system and was caught, while the victim pays the
fine if the hacker succeeds. The hacker’s and the victim’s expected fines are denoted as F1 and
F2 respectively. F1 ∈ [0, F̄1 ] is non-negative, F2 ∈ [−L, F̄2 ] where L is the victim’s loss under a
successful attack. F2 < 0 is denoted as a compensation and the social planner will not compensate
the victim more than her loss. The intended victim observes F1 and F2 and then chooses the amount
of costly security effort s to exert. The potential hacker knows the social planner and the victim’s
decisions on F1 , F2 , and s; decides whether to commit a crime, and if so, how much costly effort x
to exert to improve the chances of success.
Since F2 does not appear directly in the hacker’s expected payoff function, the best-response
function x∗ (s, F1 ) remains the same as in Chapter 1.

H(x) = p(x, s)B −

x
− (1 − p(x, s))F1
β

 p
 s(B + F )β − s for F >
1
1
∗
x (s, F1 ) =

0
for F1 ≤

s
β
s
β

(2.1)

−B

(2.2)

−B

The victim not only suffers a loss L when the hacker succeeds but also pays a fine F2 , because
the social planner can choose to punish or compensate the victim. Her expected loss is given by
V (s) = p(x, s)(L + F2 ) + s

(2.3)

In expressions (2.1) and (2.3), F1 and F2 increase the hacker’s and the victim’s payoff spread
respectively, and thus, motivate their effort. The victim incorporates the hacker’s best responses
and chooses s to minimize V (x∗ (s, F1 ), s).
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∗

s (F1 , F2 ) =




(L+F2 )2
4(B+F1 )β

for F1 >

 (B + F )β for F ≤
1
1

L+F2
2β
L+F2
2β

−B

(2.4)

−B

We have analyzed the impact of hacker’s fine F1 on the victim’s security effort in Chapter
1. Expression (2.4) simply replaces L in s∗ (F) in chapter 1 with L + F2 . It shows that security
investments and the hacker’s fine are still strategic complements when fines are small and are
strategic substitutes otherwise. The victim’s fine F2 does not appear in the bottom line of expression
(2.4), thus, it cannot affect s∗ when F1 ≤

L+F2
2β

− B. The top line of expression (2.4) shows that the

victim’s security effort can be influenced by F2 .
∂ s∗
L + F2
=
∂ F2 2(B + F1 )β
If the social planner compensates all the victim’s loss (F2 = −L), the victim exerts 0 security
effort. When the compensation is less than the victim’s loss (0 ≥ F2 > −L) and when the
social planner punishes the victim (F2 > 0),

∂ s∗
∂ F2

> 0, the victim’s security effort decreases with

compensation and increases with punishment. Compensating the victim discourages the victim to
exert security effort while punishing the victim motivates such effort.
The fines imposed on the hacker and the victim can directly influence their effort. Thus, the
social planner can deter the hacker by adjusting both fines. The following deterrence results are
obtained by simply replacing L with L + F2 in proposition 3 of chapter 1.
In equilibrium, if F2 ≥ 2β (B + F1 ) − L the hacker does not attempt a crime, because F2 enlarges
the victim’s payoff spread so that the victim exerts more security effort to avoid a larger fine.
Facing a sufficiently secured system, the hacker is discouraged and exerts zero effort yielding
H(x∗ (s∗ )) = −F1 ≤ 0 for all F1 . The hacker knows a victim subjected to a large fine has great
incentives to invest in security system. Thus, the hacker can always be deterred with a sufficiently
large F2 .
If 2β (B + F1 ) − L > F2 > β B − L, H(x∗ (s∗ )) ≤ 0 holds when

F1 ≥

2
2
( L+F
2β − B)
2
( L+F
β − B)
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= F̃1

Since F2 > β B − L, F̃1 > 0. The victim’s fine is in the intermediate range, the victim’s security
effort cannot solely deter the hacker. However, the elicited security effort in this case restores the
deterrence power of the hacker’s fine.
If F2 ≤ β B − L, H(x∗ (s∗ )) > 0 and F2 < 2β (B + F1 ) − L holds for all F1 ≥ 0. The low incentives
fail to motivate sufficient security effort from the victim. And without enough security effort, the
hacker’s fine loses deterrence power on the hacker. Thus, the hacker always attempt the crime.
Proposition 2.1. When F2 ≥ 2β B − L, the hacker is always deterred regardless of the size of the
hacker’s fine. The size of F2 does not affect social losses.
Proof. If F2 ≥ 2β (B + F1 ) − L, by expression (2.4), the victim’s security effort is β (B + F1 ) and as
proved in Chapter 1 the hacker is deterred by the victim’s security effort. Thus, the social loss W D
is determined by the victim’s security investment and s∗ = β (B + F1 ). To minimize the social loss,
the social planner does not punish the hacker (F1D = 0) yielding the social loss β B. The victim’s
fine F2D ≥ 2β B − L has no impact on social loss, because the security effort s is set according to
the hacker’s criminal incentives.
In Chapter 1, we have seen that the hacker cannot possibly be deterred in some circumstances.
A significant difference in this paper is that once the social planner can punish the victim, the
hacker can always be deterred with a sufficiently large F2 . In the next section, we explore whether
this deterrence strategy is socially optimal. More specific, we identify the optimal fine strategy
conditional on choosing to deter the hacker, and then decide whether deterrence is optimal or if the
hacker should be allowed to proceed.

2.2

Deterrence and Punishment

The social planner moves first and chooses the amount of the fines to be imposed on the hacker
and the victim to minimize social loss.


 W C (F , F ) ≡ p(x, s)(αL − B) + 1 x + s when crime attempted,
1 2
β
W (F1 , F2 ) =
 W D (F , F ) ≡ s
when no crime attempted.
1 2
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(2.5)

As with the one imposed on the hacker, the fine imposed on the victim also is transferred from them
to others in society so they have no impact on social welfare. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, the
social planner can influence the hacker’s and the victim’s best response by adjusting the expected
fines imposed. The hacker’s decision regarding whether to attempt the crime results in different
social losses. Thus, the social planner must decide whether to deter the crime by comparing the
deterrence with non-deterrence strategies.

2.2.1

Only the victim can be fined

Since only the hacker can be fined in chapter 1, let’s first assume that apprehending the hacker is
impossible and only the victim can be fined, so that F1 = 0. The social planner has one deterrence
strategy which is setting F2 ≥ 2β B − L.
Proposition 2.2. W C < W D when
α<

(β − 1)(F2 + L) + (β + 1)2β B
2β L

Proof. We know that if the hacker attempts the crime social loss is
1
x+s
β
L + F2
1 L + F2 (L + F2 )2
(L + F2 )2
= (1 −
)(αL − B) + [
−
]+
2β B
β
2
4β B
4β B

W C (F2 ) = p(x, s)(αL − B) +

Finally, if the hacker is deterred, social loss is W D (F2 ) = β B, which is independent of F2 . The
authority does not wish to deter the hacker if W D > W C . We have
W D −W C =

1
(2β B − L − F2 )(2β B − F2 − L + β L + β F2 + 2β 2 B − 2β αL)
4β 2 B

Remember that the hacker only attempts the crime if F2 < 2β B − L, and so the first term in
parentheses is positive. Thus, W D −W C has the same sign as the term in parentheses on the right.
Rearrange it:
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2β B − F2 − L + β L + β F2 + 2β 2 B − 2β αL > 0
2β αL < (β − 1)(F2 + L) + (β + 1)2β B
α<

(β − 1)(F2 + L) + (β + 1)2β B
2β L

When the social planner can only punish the victim, it is optimal for the social planner to let
the crime go when the externality is small.
Lemma 2.3. If

β −1
β

<

αL−2B
L+F̄2

then W C (F2 ) is downward sloping everywhere and so the optimal

fine contingent on accommodating is F̄2 .
Lemma 2.4. If α <

2B
L

then W C (F2 ) is upward sloping everywhere and so the optimal fine

contingent on accommodating is F2 = −L.
Proof.
∂W C (F2 )
1
= 2 [−2β (αL − B) + 2β B + 2(β − 1)(L + F2 )]
∂ F2
4β B
1
= 2 [β (2B − αL) + (β − 1)(L + F2 )]
2β B
W C (F2 ) is downward sloping when
β (2B − αL) + (β − 1)(L + F2 ) < 0
(β − 1)(L + F2 ) < β (αL − 2B)
β − 1 αL − 2B
<
β
L + F2
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and the right hand side of the above expression is decreasing in F2 . So, if it is true at F̄2 it is true
everywhere, and if it is false at F2 = −L it is false everywhere. Hence, look at F2 = −L:
β (2B − αL) > 0
α<

2B
L

Proposition 2.5. Given β > 1, the social planner elects not to deter the hacker when
(a) α <
(b)

2B
L

2B
L ,

the optimal fine is −L.

≤α <

2β B
L ,

the optimal fines imposed on the victim is F2C =

β (αL−2B)
β −1

− L.

Proof. Proposition 2.2 identifies that the deterrence strategy is inferior than the non-deterrence
strategy when α <

(β −1)(F2 +L)+(β +1)2β B
.
2β L

Because β > 1,

(β − 1)(F2 + L) + (β + 1)2β B
=
2β L
Thus, when α <

2B
L

β −1
2β (F2 + L) + (β

+ 1)B

L

>

2B
L

the social planner elects not to deter the hacker. By Lemma 2.4, W C (F2 )

increases with F2 , the optimal fine is F2C = −L. At F2C = −L, both the hacker and the victim exert
0 effort and each of them have 50% of chance to succeed according to the CSF in chapter 1. The
minimum social loss is W C (−L) = 21 (αL − B). We assume αL > B, thus, 0 < W C < 12 β B.
When

∂W C (F2 )
∂ F2

= 0, W C (F2 ) is optimized at F2 =

β (2B−αL)
β −1

− L. By proposition 2.1, F2 must be

less than 2β B − L, otherwise, the hacker is deterred. Thus,
F2 =

If
social

β (2B − αL)
− L < 2β B − L
β −1
2β B
α<
L

2β B
L , the optimal fines
B2 −α 2 L2
.
loss W C = 4β BαL−4β
4B(β −1)

2B
L

≤α <

imposed on the victim is F2C =
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β (αL−2B)
β −1

− L yielding a

W C (F2C ) −W D =

4β BαL − 4β B2 − α 2 L2
(αL − 2β B)2
−βB = −
<0
4B(β − 1)
4B(β − 1)

If hackers cannot be fined while victims can, the social planner can always deter a hacker;
however, for crimes with a relatively small externality (as shown in the green and yellow areas of
Figure 2.1) the social planner can reduce social loss by allowing the hacker to proceed.

Figure 2.1: The condition for W C < W D (Normalize

2.2.2

B
L

to 1)

Both the hacker and the victim can be fined

Now we turn to identify the optimal deterrence and punishment strategy when the social planner
can impose fines on both the hacker and the victim. We have seen in section 2 when both the hacker
and the victim can be fined, the social planner can deter the hacker with F2 ≥ 2β (B + F1 ) − L or
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with 2β (B + F1 ) − L > F2 > β B − L given F1 ≥ F̃1 . First, we examine the optimal fine strategy
conditional on choosing to deter the hacker.
Proposition 2.6. Given F̄1 ≥ F̃1 , if the social planner elects to deter the hacker, F1 must be set at
the maximum and F2 must be less than 2β B − L.
Proof. If 2β (B + F1 ) − L > F2 > β B − L, the hacker can still be deterred and the social loss W D is
p
(L+F2 )2
determined by s∗ = 4(B+F
B(B + F1 ) − L and let F̂2 ≥ 2β B − L, we have
.
Suppose
F
<
2β
2
)β
1

p
(2β B(B + F1 ))2
(L + F2 )2
W (F1 , F2 ) =
<
= β B = W D (0, F̂2 )
4(B + F1 )β
4(B + F1 )β
D

Thus, the deterrence strategy F1D = 0 and F2D ≥ 2β B − L from proposition 2.1 is never the best.
Since

∂ s∗
∂ F1

≤ 0 and

∂ s∗
∂ F2

≥ 0, the social planner must set F1 at maximum and F2 at infimum. Since

F2 belongs to an open interval (β B − L, 2β (B + F1 ) − L), in f {F2 } = β B − L < 2β B − L.
p
(L+F2 )2
F2 < 2β B(B + F1 ) − L satisfies the condition that yields s∗ = 4(B+F
)β because
1

p
F2 < 2β B(B + F1 ) − L
F2 + L p
< B(B + F1 )
2β
(L + F2 )2
L + F2
L + F2
L + F2
F1 >
−B = (
− B)(
+ 1) >
−B
2
4β B
2β
2β B
2β
2

(L+F2 )
L+F2
∗
By expression (2.4), s∗ = 4(B+F
)β if and only if F1 > 2β − B, otherwise, s = (B + F1 )β .
1

Proposition 2.6 presents a deterrence strategy that yields a lower social loss than β B.
Proposition 2.1’s deterrence strategy of no fine for the hacker and a maximal fine for the victim is
never optimal because social loss is always lower with a larger fine for the hacker and a smaller
fine for the victim.
Intuitively, the punishment should increase with the social loss. However, we find that the
optimal fines for this deterrence strategy are independent of the crime’s externality. It is because
deterrence depends on the hacker and the victim’s relative effort; the crime’s externality does not
change the hacker’s and the victim’s incentive that can motive their effort.
Proposition 2.7. Given β > 1, the social planner elects not to deter the hacker when
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(a)

2B
2B
L ≤ α ≤ L (β
β (αL−2B)
− L.
β −1

−

q
B
β (β − 1)(1 − 4(B+
)), the optimal fines are F1C = 0 and F2C =
F̄ )
1

2

βB
C
(b) α < 2B
L and F̄1 ≤ 2(αL−B) − B, the social planner sets F2 = −L. F1 is independent to social

losses.
Proof. When the hacker attempts the crime the social loss is W C (F1 , F2 ) = p(x, s)(αL − B) + β1 x +
s. Differentiating it with respect to F1 and F2 , and simplifying yields
∂W C (F1 , F2 ) (L + F2 )[2β (αL − B) − (β − 1)(L + F2 )]
=
∂ F1
4(B + F1 )2 β 2
The sign of the above expression depends on the sign of the numerator. Since F1 appears nowhere
in the numerator, no interior solution to the hacker’s fine exists; the optimal fine imposed on hacker
is either maximal or minimal.
∂W C (F1 , F2 ) (β − 1)(L + F2 ) + β (2B + F1 − αL)
=
∂ F2
4(B + F1 )β 2
When F2 =

β (αL−2B−F1 )
β −1

− L,

∂W C (F1 ,F2 )
∂ F2

= 0 and

∂W C (F1 , F2 ) (L + F2 )[2β (αL − B) − (β − 1)(L + F2 )]
=
∂ F1
4(B + F1 )2 β 2
(L + F2 )[2β (αL − B) − β (αL − 2B − F1 )]
=
4(B + F1 )2 β 2
(L + F2 )(β αL + β F1 )
=
>0
4(B + F1 )2 β 2
The hacker’s fine must be set at the minimum. Therefore, the optimal fines imposed on
the hacker and the victim are F1C = 0 and F2C =
4β BαL−4β B2 −α 2 L2
.
4B(β −1)

β (αL−2B)
β −1

− L yielding a social loss W C =

Since F2 is bounded by −L, F2C implies that αL ≥ 2B. Additionally, F2 must be

less than 2β B − L, otherwise, the hacker is deterred. The following condition must hold:
F2 =

β (αL − 2B)
− L < 2β B − L
β −1
2β B
=⇒ α <
L
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(L+F2 )2
D
4(B+F1 )β is strictly positive. The infimum of W (F1 , F2 ) =
Suppose W C < W D , W C must be less than or equal to the infimum of W D .

Case(a): W D (F1 , F2 ) = s∗ (F1 , F2 ) =
(L+in f (F2 ))2
4(B+F̄1 )β

=

β B2
.
4(B+F̄1 )

β B2
4β BαL − 4β B2 − α 2 L2
≤
4B(β − 1)
4(B + F̄1 )
β (β − 1)B3
B + F̄1
B
(αL − 2β B)2 ≥ 4B2 [β (β − 1)(1 −
)]
4(B + F̄1 )
s
2B
B
)]
=⇒ α ≥
[β + β (β − 1)(1 −
L
4(B + F̄1 )
s
2B
B
α≤
[β − β (β − 1)(1 −
)]
L
4(B + F̄1 )

(αL − 2β B)2 ≥ 4B2 β (β − 1) −

Since

WC < W D
F2C

=

q
q
2β B
B
B
2B
β (β − 1)(1 − 4(B+
β (β − 1)(1 − 4(B+
))
>
and
(β
−
)) < 2βLB ,
L
L
F̄1 )
F̄1 )
q
B
when α ≤ 2B
(β
−
β (β − 1)(1 − 4(B+
)), and the optimal fines are F1C = 0 and
L
F̄ )

2B
L (β

+

1

β (αL−2B)
β −1

− L.
2B
α−1+ β1

, the optimal fine imposed on the victim is negative F2C < 0, otherwise,
q
B
2B
C
C
C
D
F2 ≥ 0. Suppose F2 < 0 when W ≤ W , then L ≤ α (β − β (β − 1)(1 − 4(B+
)) must be a
F̄ )
When L <

1

subset of L <

2B
α−1+ β1

.

2B
2B
>
(β −
1
α
α −1+ β

s
β (β − 1)(1 −

B
))
4(B + F̄1 )

s
1
B
α − αβ + β − 1 > −(α − 1 + ) β (β − 1)(1 −
)
β
4(B + F̄1 )
(α − 1)2 (β − 1) < (α − 1 +

This inequality hold if F̄1 <

1 2
B
)
) β (1 −
β
4(B + F̄1 )

αβ −β +1
B
4 αβ −β +1−(α−1)2 (β −1)

− B.

Thus, F2C < 0, the social planner

compensates the victim.
Case(b): When α <

C
2B ∂W (F1 ,F2 )
L ,
∂ F1

> 0 and so the optimal fine for the victim contingent on

accommodation is F2C = −L. Both the hacker and the victim exert 0 effort and W C = 12 (αL − B).
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Suppose F̄1 ≤

β B2
2(αL−B)

− B,
β B2
4(B + F̄1 )
β B2
1
≥ 2β B2 = (αL − B) = W C
2

WD >

(αL−B)

If the crime’s externality α is low and the social planner has limited ability to punish the
hacker (as shown in the yellow and green areas of Figure 2.2), tolerating such crimes yields the
minimal social loss and the social planner elects not to deter the hacker. The reason is that with
limited ability to punish the hacker the victim must exert a certain amount of security effort to
stop the crime. When the cost of security effort is more significant than the crime’s harm to the
society, the social planner tolerates the property transfer from the victim to the hacker and may
even compensate the victim’s loss to reduce the cost of security effort.

Figure 2.2: The condition for W C < W D (Normalize
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B
L

to 1 and let

B
4(B+F̄1 )

= 0.1)

If the crime’s externality α is high (as shown in the blue area of Figure 2.2), the social planner
chooses to deter the hacker, fines are imposed on both the hacker and the victim. The hacker’s fine
is set at the maximum and the victim’s fine must be less than 2β B − L. The punishment motivates
the victim to provide security and prevents the victim from being discouraged by the hacker.
In light of the fact that the social planner incorporates the crime’s externality while the victim
doesn’t, it is intuitive to view the victim’s fine as a method to incorporate the externality. After all,
the victim only considers the crime’s impact on herself rather than on the society as a whole. The
fine can transfer the social loss to the victim so that she can act as a social planner.
We find that the externality affects the victim’s fine/compensation in two channels. First,
q
2B
B
according to the condition α ≤ max{ 2B
,
[β
−
β (β − 1)(1 − 4(B+
)]}, the externality deterL L
F̄ )
1

mines the criminal situations in which the hacker must not be deterred. As the externality becomes
large, the social planner prefers to deter the hacker in more criminal situations. Second, when the
social planner chooses not to deter the hacker, F2C increases with the externality meaning when the
crime’s externality is large, the victim receives less compensation from the social planner.
However, results also show that the victim’s punishment aims to restore the deterrence power
of the hacker’s fine. The crime’s externality has no impact on the size of the victim’s fine when
deterrence is optimal; thus, the victim’s fine is independent of the crime’s externality. If F2D > 0,
the fine keeps the victim from being discouraged by the hacker’s effort and exerts a certain level
of security effort so that the hacker’s expected payoff can be reduced below 0. If F2D < 0, the
social planner compensates the victim’s loss so that the victim’s security effort is reduced to a level
that cannot by itself deters the hacker. The hacker’s fine regains the deterrence power, and the
compensation helps reduce the victim’s security effort. The victim’s fine/compensation allows the
social planner to adjust the victim’s effort incentives with the hacker’s.

44

Chapter 3
Optimal Contest Design when Policing
Damaging Actions
3.1

Introduction

In many contexts, competition motivates both effort and damaging actions that do not serve the
contest organizer’s interest. Consider a sports tournament that motivates players to adopt damaging
actions that lead to fouls, disqualification, and even scandal. Competing for promotion or bonuses
in a workplace motivates employees to adopt tactics that improve short-run outcomes but may hurt
the firm’s long-run performance. For example, Wells Fargo’s aggressive sales management induced
the sales force to open 200 million accounts and to issue credit cards without the customers’
consent1 . The illegal sales practices eventually caused Wells Fargo a $185 million fine and
significant reputation losses. Just as a competitive workplace can motivate misconduct, the focus
on winning in athletics can lead to excessive damaging actions. For example, 111 Russian athletes
who cheated on a drug test were banned from the Rio Olympic Games in 2016. Although the
organizer, the International Olympic Committee, has relentlessly fought doping, athletes have
repeatedly reported such damaging actions. Understanding the optimal design of contests that
mitigates damaging actions is of central importance to the design of contests.
1 In

cases like Wells Fargo, workers (such as banks tellers, and salespeople) may not always compete for a
promotion or to avoid being demoted. However, managers often reveal workers’ weekly or monthly performance
to motivate effort. Empirical evidence suggests that simply revealing the relative performance among workers earning
the same wage creates a competitive environment (Charness, Masclet, and Villeval 2014).
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Recent work models how a contest organizer may seek to prevent damaging actions through
enforcement against cheating on these prohibitions (e.g. [5], [18], [7], [32], [11], [12]). However,
the analysis of the optimal contest design when damaging actions can occur is limited and has not
incorporated modeling prohibitions on damaging actions and of what level of damaging actions
should be prohibited, i.e. where to “draw the line.” This paper discusses the optimal design of a
contest with damaging actions available to contestants. We assume damaging actions can improve
contestants’ performance while harming the organizer and the contestants themselves (e.g. doping
risks players’ health). Additionally, inspections allow the organizer to monitor such actions, but
they are costly and imprecise. Since measured damaging actions are subject to a measurement
error, the finding of a violation (and the resulting disqualification) is not fully determined by a
contestant’s choice. Much like with speeding motorists, as contestants engage in more aggressive
behavior, the more likely they will be caught.
The organizer chooses a contest design that maximizes his/her profit of holding the contest.
Contest design consists of three instruments. First, the organizer sets a prize to the best-performing
contestant and a prize to each of the rest. The prizes motivate contestants and guarantee their
participation. Second, the organizer decides an audit (inspection) probability. An audit yields an
unbiased but noisy estimated damaging actions’ extent of each contestant. Third, the organizer
places a limit on observed damaging behavior which, if exceeded, results in disqualification.
The game proceeds as follows. The organizer moves first and commits to prizes, an audit
probability, and a damaging action limit. Then contestants observe those parameters and decide
the extent of their effort and damaging actions. The relative rankings are determined by the
contestants’ final output, which is impacted by random shocks in addition to chosen effort and
damaging actions. If no audit occurs or at least one contestant is qualified after an audit, the highest
ranking qualified contestant wins. If all contestants are disqualified, none receives the winning
prize. Disqualified contestants receive the same prize as the qualified but non-best-performing
contestants.
This framework characterizes optimal contest design in the presence of damaging actions
beyond previous studies. It produces a unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium of contestants,
and therefore, the three contest design instruments jointly influence the equilibrium effort and
damaging actions. As expected, a contestant’s effort increases with the prize spread and the limit
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on damaging actions but decreases with the audit probability. Similar to effort, the prize spread
motivate damaging actions and audit probability reduces such action, although the two instruments
have a greater impact on damaging actions. However, as the organizer raises the limit on damaging
actions, contestants commit less such actions. Once the limit is above some threshold, committed
damaging actions increase with the limit. Thus, given the price spread and audit probability,
the limit on damaging actions can reinforce the deterrence power on such action. The reason
is that contestants view “crossing the line” less beneficial when the organizer extends the line—
the reduced costs of disqualification and committing damaging actions outweigh the benefit from
crossing the line.
Intuitively, the organizer sets higher prizes as contestants’ output becomes more valuable. Since
a higher prize motivates not just more effort but also greater damaging actions, the optimal contest
design requires stronger deterrence power, which naturally leads to a higher audit probability and
limit on such actions. However, the model shows that the optimal prize spread, audit probability,
and limit on damaging actions do not increase continuously with the output value. When the value
of output is low relative to the cost of auditing, it is not optimal to engage in enforcement, but a low
prize is offered. We observe in simulations as the value of output increases it reaches a threshold
at which the optimal audit probability and prize spread increase non-continuously.
It is also intuitive that the costly and imperfect enforcement keeps the equilibrium result from
reaching the first-best outcome: the contestants behavior under optimal contest design yields suboptimal effort and a supra-optimal level of damaging behavior. Interestingly, simulations suggest
that when enforcement is employed, the welfare loss comes almost entirely from the enforcement
cost; the enforcement mechanism brings the equilibrium effort and damaging actions very close
to the first-best level. Furthermore, when the measurement of damaging actions becomes noisier
(audit is less imprecise), it is only profitable to audit contestants at a higher output value and with
a higher probability.
The major findings and explanations can be found in section 3.3 and 3.4. Section 3.3 builds
the contestants’ model and analyzes contestant’s behavior. Section 3.4 describes the organizer’s
contest design problem and identifies the optimal contest design. In each section, simulations
are used to better depict the model. Section 3.5 assumes damaging actions are valueless to the
organizer. And section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2

Literature Review

According to [19], competition encourages effort and output but also may discourage cooperation
and lead to sabotage. This study is more closely related to a subset of prior work on contests
by incorporating the idea of cheating rather than sabotage in the contest model. The distinction
is illustrated by Berentsen’s (2002) pioneer work, in which contestants decide whether to
use performance-enhancing drugs before competition. Unlike sabotage, cheating improves the
contestant’s performance. [16], [18] and [7] follow the assumption of cheating in [5] study and
model cheating as a dichotomous choice. These researchers primarily focus on conditions required
to fully deter cheating. However, in many circumstances, cheating is not just a yes-no question;
contestants also decide the extent of cheating. [11] treats cheating as a continuous variable and
finds that greater enforcement (a higher probability or randomness of detection and a penalty
for cheating behavior) reduces cheating but may also reduce effort. In addition, he notes that a
contest’s setting, such as winning by default and correlated audit, can effectively reduce cheating.
[12] further extend studies of cheating in contest by embracing the idea of marginal deterrence. In
their study, effort choice is suppressed, and cheating is not a dichotomous but a discrete variable.
The organizer can establish a tolerated level of misconduct. Misconduct that is more severe than
that at the tolerated level is prohibited and is termed “cheating.” This study is similar to yet distinct
from [12]’s work, which assumes that higher levels of damaging action constitute different actions
than lower levels. In that model, if low-level actions are tolerated, contestants can engage in them
while not facing disqualification. In the framework of this paper, the probability of disqualification
does not change discretely when a contestant “crosses the line” but rather varies continuously,
resulting in significant differences in contestant behavior.
[12] find that if the enforcement prohibiting misconduct cannot effectively deter such conduct,
that enforcement is not optimal. Their finding is analogous to findings about “marginal deterrence”
in the enforcement literature. The notion has been articulated by [22], [2], and [4] as “to induce a
man to choose always the least mischievous of two offenses; therefore where two offenses come in
competition, the punishment for the greater offense must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the
less.” [31] originated the term marginal deterrence, which was later developed by [34], [24], [26],
and [10]. They studied conditions under which marginal deterrence requires gradual penalties.
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[25] extend the model to a general setting in which the activity level is a continuous variable and
individuals derive heterogeneous benefits. These researchers show that it is optimal to establish
marginal expected penalties everywhere less than the marginal harm.

3.3

A Contest With Limited Damaging Actions

This section models contestants’ behavior in a two-player winner-take-all (WTA) contest. We take
as given the prize spread S, an audit probability η, and a limit on damaging actions L. Contestants
choose effort, µ, and damaging actions, γ. Section 3.3.1 provides a basic setting for modeling the
contestants’ game. Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 identify the impact of a contest’s design instruments
on contestants’ strategies.

3.3.1

Environment

In this WTA tournament model, two risk-neutral contestants (indexed as i ∈ { j, k}) compete to
generate the highest outputs qi . The organizer observes output but cannot perfectly ascertain how
the output is generated. A player produces output according to

qi = µi + γi + εi
where µi represents effort. γi represents the extent of damaging actions which improve output and
εi is an error term drawn from a known distribution with zero mean and variance σ12 . As is standard
in tournament models, εi can be viewed as luck (i.e. unobserved and uncontrollable production
forces). We denote e as the difference between two players’ output error terms, e = εk − ε j . e
follows a joint distribution G(.), and g(.) is the density function.
With probability η, the organizer audits both players. If an audit occurs the organizer observes
an estimate of damaging actions γi +δi , where δi represents a measurement error. The measurement
error is drawn from a known distribution H(.) with zero mean and variance σ22 . For example, the
use of a performance-enhancing drug may be controlled by a marker of its impact, such as RBC
count; A test of this marker may be used for enforcement, but is an imprecise measure of the level
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of drug use. To simplify the model, we assume that the amount of effort and the extent of damaging
actions do not influence the distributions.
Before the contest starts, contestants observe the prize for the winner and the loser, which are
denoted as W1 and W2 , respectively. The difference between W1 and W2 is represented by S, the
prize spread. Contestants also are informed not only about the possibility of being audited for
damaging actions but also about the organizer’s limit on those actions, which are denoted as η
and L. These contestants simultaneously choose effort µ ∈ R+ and damaging actions γ ∈ R+ .
Damaging actions such as cheating can hurt the reputation of contestants and ethically/morally
burden them. Therefore, we assume that effort and damaging actions are costly to contestants and
00

00

are produced at cost c(µ) and z(γ) with c0 > 0, c > 0, limµ→0 c0 (µ) = 0 and with z0 > 0, z > 0,
limγ→0 z0 (γ) = 0. Contestant j’s expected payoff for participating in the contest is given by

π j =(1 − η)G(µ j + γ j − µk − γk )S
+ ηH(L − γ j )[(1 − H(L − γk )) + H(L − γk )G(µ j + γ j − µk − γk )]S +W2 − c(µ j ) − z(γ j )
(3.1)
The payoff function, reflecting the expected benefit from winning the contest, contains the
expected benefit from winning without and with an audit occurring. If the organizer does not audit
the players, player j wins by outperforming player k; the outputs of the players determine their
rank. If the organizer audits the contestants, contestant j is disqualified and receives W2 if the test
result shows he participates in more damaging actions than the organizer has agreed to tolerate,
γ j + δ j > L. The probability of disqualification is 1 − H(L − γ j ). If player j is still qualified after
the audit, he automatically wins if player k is disqualified; otherwise, player j must outperform
player k to win. Contestant j’s best response functions are
FOC w.r.t γ j
(1 − η)g(µ j + γ j − µk − γk )S
+ η[−h(L − γ j )(1 − H(L − γk )) − h(L − γ j )H(L − γk )G(µ j + γ j − µk − γk )
+ H(L − γ j )H(L − γk )g(µ j + γ j − µk − γk )]S = z0 (γ j )
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FOC w.r.t µ j
(1 − η)g(µ j + γ j − µk − γk )S
+ ηH(L − γ j )H(L − γk )g(µ j + γ j − µk − γk )S = c0 (µ j )
The two contestants are identical; therefore, we impose symmetry on the first order conditions
to identify the contestant’s unique symmetric equilibrium, which is implicitly characterized by the
following:
(1 − η)g(0)S + η[−h(L − γ ∗ ) + (1 − G(0))h(L − γ ∗ )H(L − γ ∗ ) + (H(L − γ ∗ ))2 g(0)]S = z0 (γ ∗ )
(3.2)
(1 − η)g(0)S + η(H(L − γ ∗ ))2 g(0)S = c0 (µ ∗ )

(3.3)

For the contest design problem we study, expression (3.2) must hold at a strictly positive γ for
interior solution to exist. We assume throughout that this condition is satisfied.
To guarantee an interior solution, this study focuses on contests in which the contestants’
marginal cost of committing damaging actions is low, so that the contestants have strong incentives
to cheat. The probability of qualification, H, is low when the organizer sets the limit on damaging
actions at 0.

3.3.2

Contestants’ Behavior in Equilibrium

In order to model contest design we must identify how contestants’ equilibrium behavior changes
with the contest’s design parameters: S, η, and L. Comparative static analysis of expressions (3.2)
and (3.3) allow us to identify the impact of contest design parameters on contestants’ effort and
damaging actions.
Proposition 3.1. A larger prize spread induces more damaging activities while the audit
probability reduces such activities,

∂ γ∗
∂S

> 0 and

activities is ambiguous in general.
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∂ γ∗
∂η

< 0. The effect of the limit on damaging

Proof. As Equation (3.2) shows, damaging actions γ are independent of the effort µ. To find the
impact of exogenous variables (S, η, L) on γ ∗ I apply the implicit theorem.
(1 − η)g(0) + η[−(1 − 12 H(L − γ ∗ ))h(L − γ ∗ ) + g(0)H 2 (L − γ ∗ )]
∂ γ∗
=−
>0
∂S
SOC
The numerator represents the marginal benefit of participating the contest normalizing the prize
spread to 1. The numerator must be positive to guarantee an interior solution of γ; otherwise, the
optimal damaging action is 0, which is not within this study’s scope.
−S[(1 − H 2 (L − γ ∗ ))g(0) + (1 − 12 H(L − γ ∗ ))h(L − γ ∗ )]
∂ γ∗
=−
<0
∂η
SOC
H is the probability of qualification when a contestant is audited, thus, is less than 1. The sign
of

∂ γ∗
∂η

is negative meaning both players commit less damaging actions as the audit probability

rises. The negative sign is intuitive because a higher audit probability elevates the marginal cost of
damaging actions (the marginal benefit of qualification).

ηS[( 12 H(L − γ ∗ ) − 1)h0 (L − γ ∗ ) + 21 h2 (L − γ ∗ ) + 2g(0)h(L − γ ∗ )H(L − γ ∗ )]
∂ γ∗
=−
∂L
SOC
The first term insides the square brackets in the numerator is negative when h0 > 0.The sign of
∂ γ∗
∂L

depends on h0 , which is the slope of the measurement error’s probability distribution function.

The measurement error follows a symmetric unimodal distribution with density monotonically
decreasing as distance from the mean increases, thus, h0 will be positive and then be negative as
L increases. At low L,

∂ γ∗
∂L

can be negative, because the probability of qualification, H can small

and h0 can be large. In other words, if the optimal damaging actions’ level is high, tolerating some
damaging actions largely increases the probability of qualification’s changing speed. Thus, the
extent of damaging actions has a greater impact on the probability of qualification and contestants
are more willing to reduce damaging actions. As the organizer extends the limit on damaging
actions further, the probability of qualification increases, and the impact of damaging actions on
probability of qualification diminishes. Eventually,
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∂ γ∗
∂L

becomes positive. Since the sign of

∂ γ∗
∂L

changes from negative to positive as the organizer raises L, a L̃ yielding the minimum γ ∗ must
exist.
In contrast, the optimal effort µ ∗ not only can be influenced by the same exogenous variables
(S, η, and L) but also is jointly determined by γ ∗ as Equation (3.3) shows. The effort µ ∗ decreases
as the probability of qualification, H, decreases. By applying the Cramer’s Rule, we identify the
sign of the comparative statics for µ ∗ .
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Proposition 3.2. When z (γ ∗ ) > [(1 − 12 H(L − γ ∗ ))h0 (L − γ ∗ ) − 12 h2 (L − γ ∗ )]ηS > 0, contestants
exert more effort when the organizer sets a higher prize spread or tolerates more damaging actions,
∂ µ∗
∂S

> 0 and

∂ µ∗
∂L

> 0. However, contestants reduce effort as the audit probability grows,

∂ µ∗
∂η

< 0,

and as the organizer tolerates more damaging actions, contestants may work harder under a higher
audit probability,

∂ µ∗
∂η

> 0.

Proof. (See Appendix C1)
To guarantees a contestant’s payoff can be maximized by an interior solution, we also assume
00

throughout the paper that z (γ ∗ ) > [(1 − 21 H(L − γ ∗ ))h0 (L − γ ∗ ) − 12 h2 (L − γ ∗ )]ηS > 0 so that the
second order condition with respect to γ is negative.
The Propositions (3.1) and (3.2) show that tolerating some damaging actions can effectively
restrain more damaging actions while motivating the desired effort.

3.3.3

Simulation

Simulations are used to depict the contestants’ behavior and to further illustrate Propositions (3.1)
and (3.2). We assume that both the output shock and damaging actions’ measurement error follow
a standard normal distribution: G(.), H(.)∼normal(0, 1).
In this simulation, S = 10, c(µ) = 0.75µ 2 , and z(γ) = 0.5γ 2 . Thus, the marginal cost of effort
is higher than the marginal cost of damaging actions. By changing the limit on damaging actions,
the organizer impacts the marginal cost of committing such actions, an indirect cost of damaging
actions.
Figure 3.1 shows that the limit on damaging actions that minimizes equilibrium γ ∗ is strictly
positive. As the organizer tolerates more damaging actions, the probability of qualification
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Figure 3.1: Optimal Effort, Damaging Actions, and Player’s Payoff (S = 10, η = 0.4)
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increases so does the marginal cost of damaging actions; therefore, players commit less damaging
actions, yielding a higher probability of qualification and a higher amount of effort.
If the prize spread is increased from 10 to 12 but the audit probability is fixed at 0.4 as Figure
3.2 shows, players’ optimal effort and damaging actions increase. The organizer must tolerate
more damaging actions to trigger a sharp drop in those actions. Additionally, a larger prize spread
generates a more intense competition; as a result, both players are worse off.

(a) S = 10

(b) S = 12

Figure 3.2: Optimal Effort, Damaging Actions, and Player’s Payoff (η = 0.4)
In Figure 3.3, the organizer increases the audit probability from 0.4 to 0.5 while S remains 10.
The higher audit probability raises the damaging actions’ marginal cost (i.e., the disqualification
cost); thus, the optimal damaging actions in Figure 3.3b is lower at any L compared to those
actions in Figure 3.3a. Players’ payoff are higher under a high audit probability because audit
reduces players’ winning probability, yielding a less competitive contest.
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(a) η = 0.4

(b) η = 0.5

Figure 3.3: Optimal Effort, Damaging Actions, and Player’s Payoff (S = 10)

3.4

Optimal Contest Design

In this section, we identify the optimal contests design that maximizes the organizer’s expected
payoff given output value α and cost of audit r. We endogenize the organizer’s choice of three
contest design instruments: the prize spread, the audit probability, and the limit on damaging
actions. The organizer’s choices will determine contestants’ effort and damaging actions according
to the symmetric equilibrium identified in expressions (3.2) and (3.3). We begin the analysis by
modeling the organizer’s contest design problem and then solve for the optimal choice of the
contest design instruments, given the outside condition the organization faces (α, r).

3.4.1

Organizer’s Problem

From the organizer’s perspective, damaging actions benefit the organization through increased
output. However, those actions are also detrimental to the organizer. Damage may result from
the organizer’s reputation, or the organizer may face severe penalties and government regulations
afterward. The damages to the organizer caused by damaging actions are denoted by D : R+ → R+ ,
which is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and twice differentiable. To deter contestants from
committing damaging actions, the organizer announces an audit rate η ∈ [0, 1] at the beginning of
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the contest. An audit’s cost per player is represented by a constant rate r ∈ R+ . If the player with
the highest output is disqualified, the second-ranked qualified contestant wins by default.
The organizer holding the competition maximizes its expected payoff by modifying the contest
design through the following instruments: the prizes for the winner and the loser, the audit
probability, and the limit on damaging actions.
j,k

V (S, η, L) = αE(q j + qk ) − 2rη − 2W2 − E(S) − ∑ D(γi )

(3.4)

i

The organizer’s expected benefit comes from the total output value. Its expected loss comes
from the enforcement, contest awards, and contestants’ damaging actions. With a probability η,
the organizer conducts an audit costing r for each player. The organizer also expect to award a
prize W2 to the loser and W2 + S to the winner. When both players are disqualified by an audit,
the organizer reserves the winner’s prize and awards W2 to both players. A contestant’s Damaging
actions causes a expected damage, D(γi ) to the organizer.
The payoff function is subject to the following constraints:
γ j = γk = γ ∗
µ j = µk = µ

∗

(3.5)

Expression (3.5) is a incentive compatibility constraint. In equilibrium, the identical players choose
the same optimal effort and damaging actions according to equilibrium identified earlier.

E(S) = [1 − η(1 − H(L − γ j ))(1 − H(L − γk ))]S

(3.6)

The expected prize spread excludes the probability in which both contestants are disqualified. If
at least one of the contestants is qualified, the organizer must provide S + W2 to the contestant
produced the highest output and W2 to another contestant. Otherwise, both contestants are
disqualified and receive W2 . Thus, the expect prize awarded in the contest sums to 2W2 + E(S).
1
1
(1 − η)S + ηH(L − γ ∗ )[1 − H(L − γ ∗ )]S +W2 − c(µ ∗ ) − z(γ ∗ ) ≥ u
2
2
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(3.7)

Inequality (3.7) is the participation constraint. The contestant’s expected payoff must be higher
than the reservation utility to ensure that joining the competition is better than any outside options.
The inequality will bind at the optimum. The organizer incurs the cost of the contestants’ effort
and damaging actions, c(µ ∗ ) because contestants anticipate equilibrium of the game and participate
only if these are compensated in expectation.
Combining (3.6) with the binding (3.7), we find
E(S)
+W2 = u + c(µ ∗ ) + z(γ ∗ )
2

(3.8)

Substituting constraints (3.5) and (3.8) into expression (3.4), organizer’s objective function can
be restated as
V (S, η, L) = 2α(µ ∗ + γ ∗ ) − 2rη − 2u − 2c(µ ∗ ) − 2z(γ ∗ ) − 2D(γ ∗ )

(3.9)

The first order conditions of the organizer’s expected payoff function are

w.r.t S
(α − c0 (µ ∗ ))

∂ γ∗
dµ ∗
− (z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ) − α)
=0
∂S
∂S

(3.10)

(α − c0 (µ ∗ ))

∂ µ∗
∂ γ∗
− (z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ) − α)
=r
∂η
∂η

(3.11)

(α − c0 (µ ∗ ))

∂ µ∗
∂ γ∗
− (z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ) − α)
=0
∂L
∂L

(3.12)

w.r.t η

w.r.t L

First best. Since it is optimal to elicit effort to the point where the marginal cost equals the
effort’s marginal benefit, the first best effort can be derived from expression (3.9):
0

µ FB := c −1 (α)
The same idea applies to the first best damaging actions,
γ FB := f −1 (α)

where
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f = z0 + D0

Second best. Expression (3.11) shows that the first best outcome is not achievable because
measuring the level of damaging actions is costly. The following propositions are obtained from
expressions (3.10), (3.11), and (3.12).
0

Proposition 3.3. α − c0 (µ) > 0 and z (γ) + D0 (γ) − α > 0 at Ŝ, η̂, and L̂. The contestants behavior
under optimal design yields sub-optimal effort and a supra-optimal level of damaging behavior.
Proof. Suppose the organizer sets the S such that µ ∗ = µ FB when η = 0. Contestants’ symmetric
equilibrium (expressions 3.2 and 3.3) becomes
γ : g(0)S = z0 (γ ∗ )
µ : g(0)S = c0 (µ ∗ ) = α
The γ FB is obtained if z0 (γ FB ) + D0 (γ FB ) = α. Since z0 (γ ∗ ) = α > α − D0 (γ FB ), z0 (γ ∗ ) must be
greater than z0 (γ FB ), and γ ∗ > γ FB .
Note that we have proved when η = 0 the S that induces µ FB is such that γ ∗ > γ FB . Further,
when enforcement is presented, µ ∗ is lower than µ FB when η = 0, holding other things constant.
Therefore, in order for α − c0 (µ) < 0, i.e. effort above the first best, would require S be set above
the level that would induce µ FB in the absence of enforcement. So it can’t be the case that α −
0

c0 (µ) < 0 and z (γ)+D0 (γ)−α < 0 (i.e. supra-optimal µ and sub-optimal γ), because the organizer
could increase γ toward the optimal costlessly (or at negative cost) by reducing enforcement.
Both

∂ µ∗
∂S

and

∂ γ∗
∂S

are positive; thus, according to Equation (3.10), α − c0 (µ ∗ ) and z0 (γ ∗ ) +
0

D0 (γ ∗ ) − α must have the same sign. Therefore, it must be the case that α − c0 (µ) > 0 and z (γ) +
D0 (γ) − α > 0. The optimal η̂, Ŝ and L̂ induce µ ∗ < µ FB and γ ∗ > γ FB .
Proposition 3.4. The optimal limit on damaging actions L̂ must be such that

∂ γ∗
∂L

> 0. L̂ does not

minimize damaging actions conditional on other design parameters.
Proof. I have proved that α − c0 (µ ∗ ) and z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ) − α are positive. Intuitively, the cost of
audit prevents the organizer from achieving the first-best outcome.
Based on expression (3.12), the sign of

∂ γ∗
∂L

must be the same as

∂ µ∗
∂L

0 means the extent of damaging actions exceeds the minimum. Since
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at the optimum;
∂ γ∗
∂L

∂ γ∗
∂L

>

decreases and then

increases with the limit on damaging actions, the optimal limit L̂ is higher than the limit that yields
∂ γ∗
∂L

= 0.
∗

Expression (3.11) shows that η̂ = 0 if r is sufficiently large such that (α0 − c0 (µ ∗ )) ∂∂µη −
∗

(z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ) − α0 ) ∂∂γη − r < 0. Holding everything constant but increase α , α1 − c0 (µ ∗ )
∗

∗

increases while z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ) − α1 decreases. (α − c0 (µ ∗ )) ∂∂µη − (z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ) − α) ∂∂γη − r
becomes more negative. The organizer does not have direct incentives to audit contestants and
does not need to consider setting L.
∗

∗

Meanwhile, as expression (3.10) shows (α − c0 (µ ∗ )) ∂∂µS − (z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ) − α) ∂∂γS > 0. It
is optimal for the organizer to raise Ŝ, which creates an indirect incentive for auditing because
the increased Ŝ motivates more µ ∗ and γ ∗ . When η = 0, increasing Ŝ motivates more damaging
actions than effort because the marginal cost of effort is higher. Thus, the marginal benefit of audit
increases with Ŝ, and once the marginal benefit reaches r, we obtain an interior solution of η̂. To
reduce the expect cost of audit, L must be set at the value that yield the largest

∂ γ∗
∂η .

However, the crossing effects among the three optimal contest design variables are complicated, the above statement cannot be proved explicitly. We use simulation to examine the optimal
contest design.

3.4.2

Simulation

Simulations can further illustrate how the organizer’s decisions regarding the prize spread, audit
probability, and limit on damaging actions optimally respond to changes in output value or audit
cost. These simulations are conducted assuming the cost of damaging actions to the organizer is
D = (2γ ∗ )2 , the cost of an audit is r = 5 or r = 10, and the output value increases from 1 to 10.
Observation: When the cost of audit is sufficiently large, there exists an output value α̂ such
that for α < α̂, η̂ = 0, for α ≥ α̂, η̂ > 0. Ŝ increases tremendously at α̂, and both Ŝ and η̂ increase
with α.
Table 3.1 shows when the output value is below the threshold, α̂ = 4, the organizer does not
motivate too much effort. Thus, the prize spread is set low so that contestants have less incentive
to engage in damaging activity. Furthermore, conducting an audit is costly and brings very few
benefit. As the output value rises, output becomes more profitable and the organizer is willing to
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Table 3.1: The optimal prize spread, audit probability, limit on damaging actions, and organizer’s
payoff as the output value rises (r = 5, δ ∼normal(0, 1))
α
Ŝ
η̂
L̂
V∗
V FB
µ∗
µ FB
γ∗
γ FB

1

2

0.7
0
any
0.4889
0.8667
0.1862
0.6667
0.2793
0.2

1.5
0
any
1.9602
3.4667
0.3989
1.3333
0.5984
0.4

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2.2
18
23.9
29
34
38.4
42.4
46.6
0
0.53
0.54
0.54
0.54
0.54
0.54
0.55
any
0.5
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.3
1.8
4.4116 8.4794 16.2553 25.7818 37.0398 50.0381 64.6665 81.1484
7.8000 13.8667 21.6667 31.2000 42.4667 55.4667 70.2000 86.6667
0.5851 2.5428 3.2953 3.9822 4.6538 5.2652 5.7122 6.6538
2.0000 2.6667 3.3333 4.0000 4.6667 5.3333 6.0000 6.6667
0.8777 0.9134 1.0429 1.2596
1.473 1.6657
1.843
2.06
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2

L̂ − γ ∗

-0.4134 -0.4429 -0.4596

-0.473 -0.4657

-0.543

-0.26

provide a high S to motivate more effort. At the equilibrium, the effort is less than the first-best
outcome and the level of damaging actions is higher than the first-best outcome. The optimal
prize spread increasing from 2.2 to 18 is observed to be discontinuous at α̂. The optimal audit
probability in this simulation discretely increases from 0 to 0.53. For α ≥ α̂, welfare loss comes
almost entirely from the cost of audit. The second-best effort and damaging actions become very
close to the first-best outcome. For α < α̂, welfare loss is due to sub-optimal effort resulting from
lack of incentive. Note that when enforcement is in use, the optimal limit on damaging actions is
always set below the damaging actions in equilibrium.
Additionally, Ŝ increases tremendously at α̂. When the organizer sets η̂ > 0, contestants exert
less effort and damaging actions, thus, α̂ − c0 (µ ∗ ) increases while z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ) − α̂ decreases.
Intuitively, S can induce less damaging actions at a higher audit probability because the marginal
cost of such actions rises. Thus,

∂ γ∗
∂S

∗

∗

decreases and (α − c0 (µ ∗ )) ∂∂µS − (z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ) − α) ∂∂γS can

be greater than 0. The organizer must raise Ŝ further until expression (3.10) holds.
In Table 3.2, the cost of audit r is increased from 5 to 10. Comparing the simulation results
with Table 3.1, the threshold for the organizer to audit contestants lies at a higher output value,
α̂ = 6. Because the cost of an audit is higher, the organizer chooses not to audit contestants until
the prizes motivate a high level of damaging actions. Surprisingly, the optimal audit probability
in this simulation still discretely increases from 0 to 0.53 when α reaches the critical value. In
contrast, the optimal limit on damaging actions is higher at α̂ when r = 10. An explanation relates
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to the audit’s marginal benefit. Since enforcement brings second-best outcomes close to the firstbest, α − c0 (µ ∗ ) and z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ) − α are very small. Thus, the magnitude of

∂ γ∗
∂η

in expression

(3.11) must be large enough to guarantee an interior solution for η. Given Ŝ and L̂, the marginal
benefit of audit can be maximized around η̂ = 0.53.
Table 3.2: The optimal prize spread, audit probability, limit on damaging actions, and organizer’s
payoff as the output value rises (r = 10, δ ∼normal(0, 1))
α
Ŝ
η̂
L̂
V∗
V FB
µ∗
µ FB
γ∗
γ FB

1

2

0.7
0
any
0.4889
0.8667
0.1862
0.6667
0.2793
0.2

1.5
0
any
1.9602
3.4667
0.3989
1.3333
0.5984
0.4

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2.2
2.9
3.7
27.2
33.5
38.4
42.4
46.7
0
0
0
0.53
0.54
0.54
0.54
0.54
any
any
any
0.9
1
1.2
1.4
1.8
4.4116 7.8410 12.2547 20.4111 31.6450 44.6381 59.2665 75.7454
7.8000 13.8667 21.6667 31.2000 42.4667 55.4667 70.2000 86.6667
0.5851 0.7713 0.9841 3.7992 4.6039 5.2652 5.7122 6.5964
2.0000 2.6667 3.3333 4.0000 4.6667 5.3333 6.0000 6.6667
0.8777 1.1569 1.4761 1.3603 1.4562 1.6657 1.8430 2.1509
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2

L̂ − γ ∗

-0.4603 -0.4562 -0.4657

-0.443 -0.3509

From the organizer’s perspective, damaging actions have both positive and negative impacts
on payoff. They increase the output but potentially damage the organization. When the output
value is not as high, the organizer weighs the negative impact more and wants to eliminate the
most damaging actions with the least cost. Therefore, an audit’s marginal deterrence power must
be high; otherwise, the marginal benefit of an audit cannot surpass the audit’s marginal cost.
An audit’s marginal deterrence power is affected by the damaging actions’ distribution of
measurement error. When the measurement error follows a normal distribution and the probability
of qualification is low when the extent of damaging actions γ ∗ is much higher than the limit on
damaging actions L, the organizer has the incentive to raise the audit probability because as the
gap between γ ∗ and L shrinks, the unconditional probability of qualification, H, increases at an
increasing speed until it reaches 0.5. On the other side, an audit’s deterrence power can be greatly
00

reinforced by limiting damaging actions at a high H or h0 . Under a normal distribution, the
unconditional probability of qualification must be less than 0.5 and greater than the γ ∗ − L that
yields the highest h0 .
To show how the audit probability depends on the measurement error’s distribution, we double
the variance of the standard normal distribution so the measured extent of damaging actions
62

becomes noisier. As Table 3.3 shows, the optimal audit probability jumps to 0.72 when the
organizer starts to audit contestants. The intuition behind this effect is that when the measurement
for damaging actions is noisy, the audit probability must be able to keep the unconditional
probability of qualification H at the point where the marginal deterrence power for damaging
actions is the sufficiently large.
Table 3.3: The optimal prize spread, audit probability, limit on damaging actions, and organizer’s
payoff as the output value rises (r = 5, δ ∼normal(0, 2))
α
Ŝ
η̂
L̂
V̂
V FB
µ∗
µ FB
γ∗
γ FB

1

2

0.7
0
any
0.4889
0.8667
0.1862
0.6667
0.2793
0.2

1.5
0
any
1.9602
3.4667
0.3989
1.3333
0.5984
0.4

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2.2
2.9
35.7
43.7
51.1
60.3
68.29
75.92
0
0
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.725
0.726
0.726
any
any
0
0.1
0.3
0.45
0.63
0.83
4.4116
7.841 14.4104 23.9275 35.1668 48.2043 62.9355 79.4011
7.8000 13.8667 21.6667 31.2000 42.4667 55.4667 70.2000 86.6667
0.5851 0.7713 3.2424 3.8824 4.5252 5.2911 5.9729 6.6364
2.0000 2.6667 3.3333 4.0000 4.6667 5.3333 6.0000 6.6667
0.8777 1.1569 1.0936 1.3018 1.5182 1.6441 1.8262 2.0291
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2

L̂ − γ ∗

-1.0936 -1.2018 -1.2182 -1.1941 -1.1962 -1.1991

Table 3.4 shows that α̂ increases with the cost of audit, however, the optimal audit probability
remains at 0.72 when the organizer engages in enforcement.
Table 3.4: The optimal prize spread, audit probability, limit on damaging actions, and organizer’s
payoff as the output value rises (r = 10, δ ∼normal(0, 2))
α
Ŝ
η̂
L̂
V∗
V FB
µ∗
µ FB
γ∗
γ FB

1

2

0.7
0
any
0.4889
0.8667
0.1862
0.6667
0.2793
0.2

1.5
0
any
1.9602
3.4667
0.3989
1.3333
0.5984
0.4

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2.2
2.9
3.7
4.4
51.1
57.7
65.1
75.3
0
0
0
0
0.72
0.72
0.72
0.725
any
any
any
any
0.3
0.6
0.8
0.86
4.4116
7.841 12.2547 17.6466 27.9668 40.9348 55.6357 72.1473
7.8000 13.8667 21.6667 31.2000 42.4667 55.4667 70.2000 86.6667
0.5851 0.7713 0.9841 1.1702 4.5252 5.1884 5.8353 6.6083
2.0000 2.6667 3.3333 4.0000 4.6667 5.3333 6.0000 6.6667
0.8777 1.1569 1.4761 1.7553 1.5182 1.7417 1.9572 2.0534
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2

L̂ − γ ∗

-1.2182 -1.1417 -1.1572 -1.1934
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3.5

Valueless Damaging Actions

Now I turn to assuming that damaging actions have no market value although such actions can
improve contestants’ performance. In many contests, damaging actions improve a contestant’s
performance, however, bring no benefit to the organizer. For example, in a promotion contest, firm
managers have incentives to exaggerate their performance by manipulating numbers on the balance
sheet, such as falsely increase the depreciation time length for their property, keep huge debts off,
inflate revenues, and so on. However, the improved performance has no value to their firms. We
rewrite the expression (3.9) as,
V (S, η, L) = 2α µ ∗ − 2rη − 2u − 2c(µ ∗ ) − 2z(γ ∗ ) − 2D(γ ∗ )

(3.13)

The first-best effort yields α − c0 (µ ∗ ) = 0 and the first-best damaging actions is 0 because such
actions create no value to the organizer. The first order conditions of the organizer’s expected
payoff function become
w.r.t S
(α − c0 (µ ∗ ))

dµ ∗
∂ γ∗
− (z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ))
=0
∂S
∂S

(3.14)

(α − c0 (µ ∗ ))

∂ γ∗
∂ µ∗
− (z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ))
=r
∂η
∂η

(3.15)

(α − c0 (µ ∗ ))

∂ µ∗
∂ γ∗
− (z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ))
=0
∂L
∂L

(3.16)

w.r.t η

w.r.t L

Proposition 3.5. At Ŝ, η̂, and L̂, the contestants behavior under optimal design yields sub-optimal
effort and a supra-optimal level of damaging behavior.
Proof. By expression (3.14), α − c0 (µ ∗ ) and z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ) must have the same sign. Therefore,
0

it must be the case that α − c0 (µ ∗ ) > 0 and z (γ ∗ ) + D0 (γ ∗ ) > 0. The optimal η̂, Ŝ and L̂ induce
µ ∗ < µ FB and γ ∗ > γ FB .
Using the same simulation setting as in the previous section, we find that the optimal audit
probability is higher in the valueless case than in the original case when damaging actions
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contribute to output. In Table (3.5), the critical value of output α̂ still equals 4, but the optimal
audit rate under α ≥ α̂ increases from around 0.5 in the original case to 0.6 and γ ∗ is low.
In the valueless case, the organizer does not tolerate any damaging actions; audits are preferred
to setting a limit on such actions. From expression (3.16) we know that

∂ γ∗
∂L

must be positive.

When enforcement is presented, the marginal benefit of increased effort is small because µ ∗ is
close to µ FB . Since L is bounded by 0, it fails to reduce γ ∗ close enough to γ FB , the marginal cost
of increased damaging actions is relatively large and outweighs the marginal benefit brought by
increased effort for any L. Thus, we obtain a corner solution for L̂—the organizer does not tolerate
any valueless damaging actions under the optimal contest design.
Table 3.5: The optimal prize spread, audit probability, limit on damaging actions, and organizer’s
payoff as the output value rises (r = 5, δ ∼normal(0, 1))
α
Ŝ
η̂
L̂
V̂
V FB
µ∗
µ FB
γ∗
γ FB

1

2

0.3
0
any
0.0784
0.6667
0.0798
0.6667
0.1197
0

0.6
0
any
0.3136
2.6667
0.1596
1.3333
0.2394
0

L̂ − γ ∗

3.6

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.9
20
25.2
30.4
35.6
40.8
45.9
51.16
0
0.608
0.612
0.617
0.619
0.62
0.622
0.623
any
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.7057 4.3622 10.329 17.6414 26.2936 36.2829 47.6083 60.2687
6.0000 10.6667 16.6667 24.0000 32.6667 42.6667 54.0000 66.6667
0.2394 2.6454 3.3174 3.9894 4.6617 5.3328 5.9957 6.6642
2.0000 2.6667 3.3333 4.0000 4.6667 5.3333 6.0000 6.6667
0.3590 0.2116 0.1987 0.1941 0.1913 0.1917 0.1853 0.1833
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0.2116 -0.1987 -0.1941 -0.1913 -0.1917 -0.1853 -0.1833

Conclusion

This paper has studied optimal design for contest that foster damaging actions. We have observed
in simulations the threshold of output value at which auditing becomes profitable to the organizer
and the optimal prize spread increases discontinuously. The intuition behind this concept is
straightforward. When the output value is low, the organizer does not offer a high prize to
motivate the output; thus, reducing a low level damaging actions is unnecessary because audit
is costly. When the output value is high, the contest organizer wishes to produce more output.
However, a higher prize to the winner elicits more desired effort as well as more damaging actions.
Setting an audit probability deters damaging actions and enhances the organizer’s profit. Once
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the enforcement is presented, prize can motivate more effort without inducing too much damaging
actions, thus, the organizer has the incentive to set a higher prize.
The limit imposed on damaging actions can reinforce the marginal deterrence power of an
audit.

By tolerating a certain level of damaging actions, the organizer largely reduces the

probability of disqualification for a contestant committing a few damaging actions. This paper has
shown that the limit under optimal contest design is always set below the equilibrium damaging
actions and above the limit that minimizes damaging actions. It is because a higher limit than the
optimum will only induce more damaging actions, and a lower limit than the optimum fails to
induce enough effort.
This framework and conclusions may be usefully applied to various competitive environment
that foster damaging actions. For instance, it explains why tournament organizers tolerate a specific
level of fouls while imposing a high inspection rate on contestants’ damaging activities, especially
in final games. It can also explain many business scandals that have perpetrated massive fraud and
deceit against customers and other shareholders. For commercial banks like Wells Fargo, the more
products a customer has with the bank, the more information it has on that customer, allowing for
better decisions about credit, products, and pricing. Convincing consumers to use more bank’s
product is a priority of sales teams. After the 2008 financial crisis the US market was reviving
several years, Wells Fargo set a high incentive for its sales team to meet cross-sell and customerservice targets. However, when a high prize is set to motivate sales, a high audit probability must be
adopted, otherwise, the extent of damaging actions will be skyrocketed. We have seen that Wells
Fargo did not impose a more severe inspection on sales and 200 million accounts were opened
without customers’ consent.
When damaging actions are valueless, the organizer always set the limit on damaging actions
to 0. It is because the optimal limit must be set lower than the first-best outcome, which is 0 in
the valueless case. Since the limit is bounded by 0, the organizer does not tolerate any damaging
actions regardless of the output value.
Thus, our model explains why some contest organizer must adopt “zero-tolerance policy.” For
example, in the national exam for college, students compete to score at the top 1% or 5% nationally.
Cheating on the test improves their score, however, the test scores improved by cheating does
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not reflect a person’s ability and have no value to the nation. Ethically and theoretically, “zerotolerance policy” is optimal in such contests.
We must acknowledge that this paper has its limitations. First, the contest has only two identical
players. Future studies can extend it to a N-player model and may incorporate asymmetry. Second,
we assume the measurement error follows a normal distribution. The assumption can be further
relaxed.
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A

Appendix A

A1. Properties of the objective functions:

H(x, s) ≡ p(x, s)B −

x
− (1 − p(x, s))F
β

(17)

The FOC is
px (x∗ , s)(B + F) −

1
=0
β

(18)

Notice the fine increases linearly, the increasing rate px decreases and converges to 0.
x∗ (s) =

p

s(B + F)β − s

(19)

The SOC is
pxx (x∗ , s)(B + F) < 0

(20)

The slope for offender’s best response (best response to security level and central planner’s
penalty) function is found through
(pxx

dx∗
+ pxs )(B + F) = 0
ds

pxs x − s
dx∗
=−
=
ds
pxx
2s
pxx

dx∗
(B + F) + px = 0
dF

dx∗
px
x+s
=−
=
>0
dF
pxx (B + F) 2(B + F)

(21)

(22)
(23)
(24)

The firm will take offender’s decision x∗ into consideration. And firm chooses s to minimize
S(x∗ , s) ≡ p(x∗ , s)L + s

73

(25)

The FOC is
[px (x∗ , s∗ )

dx∗
+ ps (x∗ , s∗ )]L + 1 = 0
ds

s∗ =

L2
4(B + F)β

(26)
(27)

Plug s∗
L
L2
x = −
2 4(B + F)β
∗

(28)

The SOC is
pxx (

dx∗ 2
dx∗
d 2 x∗
L
) + 2pxs
+ px 2 + pss = 3
1
1 >0
ds
ds
ds
4s 2 (B + F) 2 β 2

(29)

The slope for firm’s best response (best response to the penalty) function is
ds∗
L2
=−
<0
dF
4(B + F)2 β

(30)

A2. Proof for proposition 3: The central planner chooses an optimal fine that minimizes the
social loss.
x
+s
β

(31)

1
L
1
−
) − B]
[L(α
+
2β (B + F)2
2β 2

(32)

L
1
1
[L(α +
− ) − B]
3
β (B + F)
2β 2

(33)

W c (F) = p(x, s)(αL − B) +
The FOC is

The SOC is
−

1
Unless B = L(α + 2β
− 12 ), the FOC and SOC hold the opposite sign. The social loss either

increasing at a decreasing rate or decreasing at an decreasing rate.
A3. The optimal fine when the fine is costly to the social planner: Consider the case that
the penalty is costly to the social planner (the marginal cost of F is constant and is denoted as γ)
W c (F) = p(x, s)(αL − B) +

74

x
+ s + rF
β

(34)

The FOC is
r+

1
1
L
[L(α +
− ) − B]
2
2β (B + F)
2β 2

(35)

L
1
1
[L(α +
− ) − B]
3
β (B + F)
2β 2

(36)

The SOC is
−
When Bβ > L ≥

B
,
1
− 12
α+ 2β

the optimal penalty should be 0, F ∗ = 0; as we have seen, when the

penalty is social costless such as a monetary fine (γ = 0) and L <

B
,
1
α+ 2β
− 12

the optimal penalty

would be at the maximum, F ∗ = F̄. When the penalty is costly to the society(γ > 0), the optimal
penalty varies according to the offender’s technology endowment,
externality of the illegal activity,
r
the hacker’s gain, and the cost of the penalty, F ∗ =

1
−α)L]
L[B+( 21 − 2β
2γβ

− B. The optimal penalty

decreases with the cost of penalty.
1
A4. Proof for proposition 4: F is nondecreasing in B. Let Bn = L(α + 2β
− 21 ) and Bn+1 =

Bn + ε where ε > 0, so the sequence {Bn } is increasing. Plug Bn and Bn+1 into the piecewise
function F C (B, L, α), we find
F C (Bn , L, α) = 0 < F C (Bn+1 , L, α)
Let k > 1, we find
F C (Bn , L, α) = F C (Bn−k , L, α) = 0
F C (Bn+1 , L, α) = F C (Bn+k , L, α) = ∞
Thus, we conclude F C (B, L, α) is nondecreasing in B.
Similar proof for F is nonincreasing in α. Let αn =
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B
L

1
+ 12 − 2β
.

B

Appendix B

B1. Find the optimal fines when the hacker attempts a crime

 W C (F) ≡ p(x, s)(αL − B) + 1 x + s when crime attempted,
β
W (F) =
 W D (F) ≡ s
when no crime attempted.
FOC wrt F1
(L + F2 )[2αβ L + L + F2 − β (2B + L + F2 )]
4(B + F1 )2 β
SOC
−

(L + F2 )[2αβ L + L + F2 − β (2B + L + F2 )]
2(B + F1 )3 β

FOC wrt F2
(β − 1)(L + F2 ) + β (2B + F1 − αL)
=0
4(B + F1 )β 2
SOC
β −1
> 0 if β > 1
4(B + F1 )β 2
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Appendix C

C1. players’ objective function properties and comparative statics
Hessian Matrix


0
00
1 2
1

0
ηS[(1 − 2 H)h − 2 h − 2g(0)hH] − z (γ)

Hess π j = 
00
−2ηhHg(0)S
−c (µ)

(37)

To guarantee a maximum of π j , it must have f11 and f22 < 0 and |Hess(π j )| > 0. Thus, we must
0

00

have f11 = ηS[(1 − 12 H)h − 12 h2 − 2g(0)hH] − z (γ) < 0 so that f11 f22 > f12 f21 .
The direct impact of exogenous variables on damaging actions are given by
1
1
L
f13
= [−h0 (L − γ)(1 − H(L − γ)) + h2 (L − γ) + 2h(L − γ)H(L − γ)g(0)]ηS
2
2

1
η
f13
= −g(0)[1 − H 2 (L − γ)]S − h(L − γ)(1 − H(L − γ))S < 0
2
1
S
f13
= (1 − η)g(0) + η[−h(L − γ) + h(L − γ)H(L − γ) + H 2 (L − γ)g(0)] > 0
2
The direct impact of exogenous variables on effort are given by
L
f23
= 2h(L − γ)H(L − γ)g(0)ηS > 0

η
f23
= −[1 − H 2 (L − γ)]g(0)S < 0

S
= (1 − η)g(0) + ηH 2 (L − γ)g(0) > 0
f23

Compare the equations above, I find
1
1
L
L
f13
= f23
− [(1 − H)h0 − h2 ]ηS
2
2
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1
η
η
η
η
f13
= f23
− (1 − H)hS < 0 → f13
< f23
<0
2
1
S
S
f13
= f23
− (η − H)h > 0
2
00
1
1
f11 = f21 + [(1 − H)h0 − h2 ]ηS − z < 0
2
2

L
f21 = − f23
<0
L < 0, f S < f S . As
Since H is small when the limit on damaging actions is low, I get f13
23
13

the organizer increases the limit on damaging actions the contestants experience three cases: 1.
00

L < f L because z > [(1− 1 H)h0 − 1 h2 ]ηS > 0; 2. f > f , and f L < f L because
f11 < f21 , and f13
11
21
23
23
13
2
2
00

L > f L > 0 because [(1 − 1 H)h0 − 1 h2 ]ηS < 0.
[(1 − 12 H)h0 − 12 h2 ]ηS > z > 0. 3. f11 < f21 , and f13
23
2
2

With these inequalities, I am able to sign the following comparative statics.
Mathematically solving the comparative statics for µ. For case 1,
L
− f13

f11

L
L + fL f
f21 − f23
− f11 f23
∂ µ∗
(+)
13 21
=
=
>0
=
∂Ł
f
f
−
f
f
(+)
11
22
12
21
f11 f12

f21

(38)

f22
00

00

L + f L f = {[(1 − 1 H)h0 − 1 h2 ]ηS − z − [(1 − 1 H)h0 − 1 h2 ]} f > 0 since z > [(1 −
− f11 f23
21
13 21
2
2
2
2
1
1 2
0
2 H)h − 2 h ]ηS

> 0.
f11

η
− f13

η
η
η
f21 − f23
− f11 f23
+ f13
f21 (−) + (+)
∂ µ∗
=
=
<0
=
∂η
f
f
−
f
f
(+)
11
22
12
21
f11 f12

f21

(39)

f22
00

00

η
η
η
− f11 f23
+ f13
f21 = −{[(1 − 12 H)h0 − 21 h2 ]ηS − z } f23
− [(1 − 21 H)h0 − 12 h2 ] f21 < 0 since z > [(1 −
1
1 2
0
2 H)h − 2 h ]ηS

> 0 and h is small.
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f11

S
− f13

S
S + fS f
f21 − f23
− f11 f23
∂ µ∗
(+)
13 21
=
=
=
>0
∂S
f11 f22 − f12 f21
(+)
f11 f12

f21

(40)

f22
00

00

S + f S f = −{[(1 − 1 H)h0 − 1 h2 ]ηS − z } f S − (η − 1 H)h f because z > [(1 − 1 H)h0 −
− f11 f23
21
23
13 21
2
2
2
2
1 2
2 h ]ηS

> 0 and h is small. To motivate more effort, the organizer should tolerate more damaging

actions and increase the prize spread.
Similarly, for case 2, The sign of

dµ ∗
dL

is ambiguous. But

dµ ∗
dη

is positive. And

dµ ∗
dS

is negative

when η is small. The audit probability is crucial in case 2.
For case 3, The sign of

dµ ∗
dL

is ambiguous. But

dµ ∗
dη

is negative.

dµ ∗
dS

is more likely being positive.

The prize spread is crucial in case 3.
C2. Organizer’s objective function properties and comparative statics
w.r.t S
2α

dµ ∗
dγ ∗
dµ ∗
dγ ∗
dγ ∗
+ 2α
− 2c0 (µ ∗ )
− 2z0 (γ ∗ )
− 2D0 (2γ ∗ )
=0
dS
dS
dS
dS
dS
dµ ∗
dγ ∗
(α − c0 (µ ∗ ))
− (z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (2γ ∗ ) − α)
=0
dS
dS

(41)

dµ ∗
dγ ∗
dγ ∗
dµ ∗
dγ ∗
+ 2α
− 2k − 2z0 (γ ∗ )
− 2c0
− 2D0
=0
dη
dη
dη
dη
dη
dµ ∗
dγ ∗
(α − c0 (µ ∗ ))
− (z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (2γ ∗ ) − α)
=k
dη
dη

(42)

dµ ∗
dγ ∗
dµ ∗
dγ ∗
dγ ∗
+ 2α
− 2c0 (µ ∗ )
− 2z0 (γ ∗ )
− 2D0 (2γ ∗ )
=0
dL
dL
dL
dL
dL
dµ ∗
dγ ∗
− (z0 (γ ∗ ) + D0 (2γ ∗ ) − α)
=0
(α − c0 (µ ∗ ))
dL
dL

(43)

w.r.t η
2α

w.r.t L
2α
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